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ABSTRACT 
This thesis set out to find the relationship, if any, between defense spending and 
economic growth for Turkey, and to discuss the policy implications of the empirical 
results. Since Turkey has one of the largest defense budgets within the Middle East and 
also NATO, this question has important implications for Turkey’s future economic well-
being and political stability.  
Taking into account the difficulties present in previous military expenditure 
studies, an econometric model was specified and empirically tested using Turkish data 
for 1969-2004. Results suggested that there is a negative linkage between military 
expenditure and economic growth. The second part of the empirical study tested the 
defense-welfare relationship for Turkey using expenditures on health and education as 
welfare proxies. The empirical findings suggested that there are tradeoffs between 
military expenditures and welfare spending. However, there seems to be a positive 
relationship between military expenditures and education. 
The Turkish Republic’s defense policy has been continually guided by Ataturk’s 
proverb of “peace at home, peace in the world.” However, sustaining a peaceful 
environment has required a high level of military expenditures. What makes Turkey’s 
military expenditures relatively high? Is it possible to draw inferences that high military 
expenditures are a requirement for Turkey? To answer these questions, factors that are 
major reasons for high military expenditures are also discussed in this thesis. These 
include strategic factors, conflicts with PKK terrorism, disputes with Greece, the military 
modernization program, and the economic environment of Turkey.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The main purpose of this thesis is to find the relationship, if any, between defense 
spending and economic growth for Turkey, and to discuss the policy implications of the 
empirical results. In the sense of being one of the largest defense spenders within both the 
countries that make up the Middle East and NATO, this question is very crucial for 
Turkey’s future economic and political situation. The following chapters, which are 
thought to sum up the overall picture, are included in the thesis to manage the main 
purpose.    
Defense economics has emerged as a relatively new field of study within the sub- 
disciplines of economics. Interest in defense economics began during World War II and 
has continued to the present day. Chapter II introduces the definition and study areas of 
defense economics, as well as the relationship between defense economics and trends in 
world defense expenditures.  It also reveals the events that have made defense economics 
more favorable. 
Confirming a relationship between defense spending and economic growth has 
been an important area of study for defense economists, including the important 
contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978), who stated that expenditures may lead to growth by 
various factors. After Benoit’s striking results, the relationship between defense 
expenditures and economic growth attracted considerable attention among many defense 
economists, and a number of empirical studies to reveal a relationship, if any, between 
these variables have been undertaken. Chapter III presents an extensive literature review 
on the defense-growth relationship. 
Defense spending has been one of the major components of government 
expenditures both for developed and developing countries. Defense burden (defense 
spending as a share of GDP) varies by country depending on the economic, social, and 
political dimensions of both domestic and international environments. A detailed 
examination of the connection between defense spending and economic growth shows 
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that there may be some cases where making an overall generalization of a defense-growth 
relationship is not reliable. Chapter IV highlights different associations between defense 
spending and output under the light of previously published studies. 
Unfortunately, there are conceptual, methodological, and practical difficulties in 
the collecting and processing of statistical data on military expenditures. Fortunately, 
there are primary sources of information on military expenditures; however, they also 
create some of the above problems. It is important to be able to measure military 
expenditures correctly, if possible, because the results of studies pertaining to defense 
economics may affect the regional force balance. If military expenditures can not be 
measured correctly, knowing the deficiencies and constraints of studies becomes crucial 
before making any policy. Therefore, Chapter V is included to present the difficulties of 
military expenditure studies. 
The main purpose of finding the relationship, if any, between defense spending 
and economic growth for Turkey is pursued in Chapter VI. Econometric models are 
specified and empirically tested to reveal growth and welfare tradeoffs of military 
expenditures. The association between investment, barrowing, military expenditures, and 
economic growth is investigated in the first part of the empirical study. The direction and 
level of welfare tradeoffs between military expenditures and health and education for 
Turkey is investigated in the second part.  
What makes Turkey’s military expenditures relatively high? Is it possible to draw 
inferences that high military expenditures are a requirement for Turkey? To answer these 
questions, factors that are predicted to be major reasons for the high military expenditures 
of Turkey are discussed in Chapter VII. Finally, Chapter VIII discusses the conclusions 
of the thesis research and study, proposes recommendations, and draws some policy 
implications.  




II. DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND EXPENDITURES 
Within economics, a number of specialized fields as sub-disciplines of economics 
have been established such as labor economics, public finance, monetary, environmental, 
industrial organization, institutional, and development. Defense economics is a relatively 
new field of study within the sub-disciplines of economics. Interest in defense economics 
began during World War II and has continued to the present day (Hartley & Sandler, 
2001).  
That achieving macroeconomic goals makes all of society better off is a common 
opinion among economists, who agree about the importance of the following three main 
economic goals: economic growth, high employment, and stable prices (Lieberman & 
Hall, 2005, pp. 349-360). One of the major roles of government in the economy is to 
provide public goods. If a good is nonexcludable and nonrival, it is called as pure public 
good (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, pp. 339-342). National defense is one of the pure public 
goods. It is a nonexclusive good because it provides benefits for all citizens and no one 
can be excluded from enjoying it. It is also a nonrival good in that additional consumers 
may use it at zero marginal costs (Nicholson, 1997, pp. 510-514). 
A. DEFINITION OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS 
Intriligator (1990) addresses the need of identity and legitimacy for the fields of 
defense economics. Therefore, he defines defense economics within its nature and scope 
as follows (as cited in Hartley & Sandler, 2001, p. XV); 
…that part of the overall economy involving defense-related issues, 
including the level of defense spending, both in total and as a fraction of 
the overall economy; the impacts of defense expenditure, both 
domestically for output and employment and internationally for impacts 
on other nations; the reasons for the existence and size of the defense 
sector; the relation of defense spending to technical change; and the 
implications of defense spending and the defense sector for international 
stability or instability 
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Hartley and Sandler (2001) acknowledge that a broader definition of defense 
economics is also expressed by others. However, making the field’s scope so broad may 
cause it to lose its identity. They argue that if the broader definition covers conflict 
resolution and international relations, that definition may be inside the scope of peace 
economics. Despite these concerns, Herrera (1994) informs that “the subject area of 
defense economics can be defined broadly to embrace all aspects of the economics of 
defense, disarmament and peace.” The broader definition includes peace and war 
economics, arm races, alliances, disarmament, and so on (see Appendix A).  
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND THE TREND 
IN WORLD DEFENSE SPENDING 
Interest in defense economics began during World War II and has continued to 
the present day. Hartley and Sandler (2001) confirms that “contribution to the field have 
accelerated in the last two decades after the end of the Cold War which has added the 
peace keeping and peace enforcement as new topics to the study area of defense 
economics.” 
The world’s military burden ratio, namely military expenditures to GNP, fell 
sharply from 4.7% in 1989 to 2.4% in 1999. The world’s average military expenditures 
per capita ratio, a general measure of security costs, fell 43% from $254 in 1989 to $142 
in 1999 (“U.S. Department of State, WMEAT 1999-2000,” 2003). Even with dramatic 
cutbacks in “superpower military expenditures” (Zarko, 1993) after the end of the Cold 
War, security arrangements have been reestablished all around the world. One of the 
most important questions that had been thrown out for consideration from the end of the 
Cold War was how a reduction in defense spending would affect economic performance. 
This question had been very important for further policy implications for countries facing 
public demand for defense cutbacks. 
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FIGURE 1 World Military Spending
Copied from : SIPRI Yearbook 2007, World Military Spending, Table 8A.1
Note: Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or or consistent time series data. World totals 
exclude Angola, Benin, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, 
Qatar, Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago and Viet Nam.
 
Figure 1.   World Military Spending 
Turkey needed a new regional military strategy to ensure security when the 
collapse of the Soviet Union caused instability and uncertainty in the Caucasus, Middle 
East and Balkans. Contrary to the general expectation of decreases in defense budgets, 
the collapse has caused an increase in military spending in the region to cope with new 
threats and risks. This argument can be seen in Table 1  While the defense burden of the 
superpowers; such as U.S. and Russia, decreased after the Cold War until year 2001, the 
defense burden for the Middle East and Balkan countries (Israel, Iran, Syria, Turkey and 
Greece) remained high during this period. The Middle Eastern countries spent an 
estimated 6.3% of GDP on the military compared with a global average of 2.3% (SIPRI, 
2003). 
Post-Cold War security requirements have changed after the 9/11 attack on the 
World Trade Center. The Cold War military structure was built to fight big wars against 
the nation states. The 9/11 attack revealed new requirements to fight against stateless 
terror. “New concerns have included failed states, communal violence, humanitarian 
crises, and the increased traffic in drugs and light weapons” (Conetta, 2003). The new 
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shape of national defense has required military transformation. This has increased 
defense expenditures, especially for the countries that are in involved in the war on terror 
(Ateşoğlu, 2005).  
 
Country USA China Japan France Germany Russia Turkey Greece Syria Iran Israel Bulgaria
1988 5.8 .. 4.1 3.6 2.9 [15.8] 2.9 5 [6.9] 3.4 13.2 ..
1989 5.6 2.8 4 3.5 2.8 [14.2] 3.1 4.5 [7] 3.1 12.3 [4]
1990 5.3 2.7 3.9 3.4 2.8 [12.3] 3.5 4.5 [6] 2.9 12.3 [3.5]
1991 4.7 2.5 4.1 3.4 2.2 .. 3.8 4.2 [9.1] 2.5 14.8 [2.8]
1992 4.9 2.7 3.8 3.3 2 [5.5] 3.9 4.4 [7.9] 2.2 10.8 [2.7]
1993 4.5 2.1 3.5 3.3 1.9 [5.3] 3.9 4.3 [6.4] 2.3 10.6 [2.4]
1994 4.1 1.9 3.3 3.3 1.7 [5.9] 4.1 4.3 [6.5] 3.1 9.7 [3.6]
1995 3.8 1.8 3 3 1.6 [4.4] 3.9 4.2 [6.2] 2.4 8.6 [2.6]
1996 3.5 1.8 2.9 2.9 1.6 [4.1] 4.1 4.4 [5.2] 2.6 8.6 2
1997 3.4 1.7 2.7 2.9 1.5 [4.5] 4.1 4.5 [5] 2.9 8.5 2.1
1998 3.2 1.9 2.6 2.7 1.5 [3.3] 4.4 4.7 [5.1] 3.2 8.4 2.3
1999 3.1 2 2.5 2.7 1.5 [3.4] 5.4 4.8 4.8 4.1 8.3 2.5
2000 3.1 2 2.4 2.5 1.5 [3.7] 5 4.7 5.5 5.4 8 2.5
2001 3.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 1.5 [4.1] 5 4.4 5 5.7 8.1 2.7
2002 3.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.5 [4.3] 4.4 4.2 4.7 3.8 9.2 2.7
2003 3.8 2.3 2.7 2.6 1.4 [4.3] 3.8 4 5.6 4.4 8.5 2.6
2004 4 2 2.7 2.6 1.4 [3.9] 3.1 [3.9] 6.4 4.5 8.3 2.4
2005 4.1 2 2.7 2.5 1.4 [4.1] 2.8 [4.1] 5.1 5.8 9.7 2.4
. . = Data not available or not applicable
[ ] = SIPRI estimate
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Military expenditures. Facts on International Relations and Security Trends





Table 1.   Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook 2007 Chapter 
8 indicates the recent trends in military expenditures as follows (refer to Table 2):  
World military expenditure in 2006 is estimated at $1204 billion in current 
prices. This represents an increase of 3.5 per cent in real terms since 2005 
and of 37 per cent over the 10-year period since 1997. Average spending 
per capita has increased from $173 in 2005 to $177 in 2006 at constant 
(2005) prices and exchange rates and to $184 at current prices. World 
military expenditure is extremely unevenly distributed. In 2006 the 15 
countries with the highest spending accounted for 83 percent of the total. 
In 2006 China continued its steep increase in military expenditure, for the 
first time surpassing that of Japan and hence replacing Japan as the 
country in Asia with the highest level of military expenditure and as the 
fourth biggest spender in the world. Amid intense discussions on the right 
level of Japanese military spending, Japan decided, for the fifth 
consecutive year, to reduce its military spending in 2006 while at the same 
time focusing its military budget on missile defense. 
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1 USA 528.7 1756 46 5 1 USA 528.7
2 UK 59.2 990 5 1 2 China [188.2]
3 France 53.1 875 5 1 3 India 114.3
4 China [49.5] [37] [4] 20 4 Russia [82.8]
5 Japan 43.7 341 4 2 5 UK 51.4
734.2 63 29 965.5
1158 177 100 100
MER : Market Exchange Rate; PPP : Purchasing Power Parity; [ ] : Estimated figures
Sources  : Military Expenditure: SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Appendix 8A
            










TABLE 2 Top Five Military Spenders in 2006 in Market Exchange and PPP Terms
World Total
*The figures in PPP dolar terms are converted at PPP rates (for 2005), calculated by World Bank based 
on comparison of GNP 
PPP Rates: World Bank World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development 
Spending 
($b.)Spending Population
Sub Total Top 5
Military expenditure in MER dollar terms
 
Table 2.   Top Five Military Spenders in 2006 in Market Exchange and PPP Terms 
The major military spender in the world is the United States with 46 percent of 
the world total, whereas the UK, France, Japan and China follow the U.S. but far behind 
with 4-5 percent each. Therefore, U.S. military spending shapes world military 
expenditures in a dominant fashion. Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are the 
main reasons for the recent increase in U.S. military expenditures, which are labeled 
under the ‘global war on terrorism’ after the 9/11 terrorist attack.  The cost of the war on 
terrorism for the U.S. had reached $432 billion as of June 2006 (SIPRI Yearbook 2007). 
The most recent cost of the war in Iraq is $485 billion as of December 2007 (“The cost of 
the war,” 2007). SIPRI Yearbook 2007 claims that this increase in U.S. military 
expenditures has been considered as one of the major factors that has caused deterioration 
in the U.S. economy since 2001.  
Each country spares a great amount of its national budget for defense spending 
and various factors influence the defense burden for a country. The trend of military 
expenditures may change depending on the increase or decrease in conflicts and security 
concerns while the importance of defense economics is kept at a high level. The peace 
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dividend for the years of decrease opportunity cost concerns for the years of increase 
made defense economies more favorable. The recent trend in world military expenditures 
is a good reason to expect that its effects will continue for the foreseeable future. 
Among the various areas of defense economics, the burdens and benefits of 
military expenditures and their effects on economic growth within possible tradeoffs will 





















III. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
Confirming a relationship between defense expenditures and economic growth 
has been an important area of study for defense economists, including the important 
contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978), who stated that expenditures may lead to growth by 
“providing education and medical care, decreasing unemployment rate, engaging in 
variety of public works, scientific and technical innovations.” Therefore, if the military 
did not spend its money in these areas, resources would have to be provided by the 
civilian sector (Benoit, 1978). Since Benoit’s striking results, the relationship between 
defense expenditures and economic growth has attracted considerable attention among 
many defense economists. As a result, a number of empirical studies have been 
undertaken to reveal a relationship, if any, between these variables. However, there is still 
controversy about whether defense expenditures cause a higher or lower growth rate. 
There are large numbers of empirical literature studies that investigate the 
economic effects of military spending. Grouping the literature reviews is possible in 
various ways, such as: depending on correlation results between defense expenditures and 
economic growth, methods imposed, data and sample used, and significance of results 
(also see Poot, 2000).  
Arguments are not restricted to the relationship between defense expenditures and 
economic growth. Another side of the argument addresses the nature of causality between 
these two variables. Which one is causally previous to the other? Does defense spending 
initiate economic exchange or, conversely, is it affected by changes in the economy? 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. General Framework of Literature Review 
In the literature, there are three groups of economists and policy makers who 
advocate different approaches for the defense-growth relationship. One group supports 
the neo-classical approach that argues defense expenditures deter economic growth. In 
 10
other words, this group finds a negative correlation between defense expenditures and 
economic growth (Deger, 1986; Değer & Smith, 1983; Heo, 1999; Kwaben, 1989; Lim, 
1983; Shieh et al., 2002). A second group argues that the net effect of defense 
expenditures on growth is positive. This group supports the Keynesian Theory, and their 
results show a positive correlation between defense expenditures and economic growth 
(Ateşoglu, 2004; Ateşoglu & Mueller, 1990; Benoit, 1978). A third group argues that the 
relationship between defense expenditures and economic growth varies, as it could be 
positive or negative. Thus, it is not appropriate to generalize about a relationship between 
these variables for all countries. According to this perspective, there is neither a “clear-
cut prediction” nor a consistent, statistically significant result of the relationship (Biswas 
& Ram, 1986; Chowdhury, 1991; Heo, 1998; Karakul & Palaz, 2004; Looney, 1988b, 
1988a; Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b). 
Different methods have been imposed to understand the defense-growth 
relationship, such as: cross-section analysis (Benoit, 1973, 1978; Biswas & Ram, 1986; 
Değer, 1986; Değer & Smith 1983; Dune and Perlo-Freeman, 2003; Kwabena, 1989; 
Lim, 1983; Looney, 1988a; Rothschild, 1973;), time series regression analysis 
(Chowdhury, 1991; Looney, 1989; Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b), and some other 
methods (Dakurah et al., 2001; Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, 2003; Karagöl & Palaz, 2004). 
Some have argued that statistic analysis of a cross-sectional sample is not sufficient to 
show the diversity that exists in different countries because of the variation in each state’s 
economic and political systems (Ball, 1983; Heo, 1998; Looney 1988b; Yildirim & 
Sezgin, 2002). Therefore, examining the defense-growth relationship for a single country 
(Ateşoglu, 2004, 2006; Heo, 1999; Karagöl & Palaz, 2004) or employing longitudinal 
design for each country has been preferred by different authors (Heo, 1998). Also, the 
relationship between the variables was investigated for both short-term and long-term by 
different authors (Değer, 1986; Frederiksen & Looney, 1994; Poot, 2000; Shieh et al., 
2002).  
Since it is not possible to generalize the relationship between defense 
expenditures and economic growth for all, some authors have tried to find common 
features for similar countries. They have grouped countries dependent upon their 
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commonalities, such as: non-conflict and conflict states (Looney, 1988b), dependence on 
geography (Dunne & Perro, 2003; Kwabena, 1989), regional sensitivity (Heo, 1996; 
Kollias, 1994,1995; Kollias & Makrydokis, 1997; Öcal, 2002), organization (Hassan et 
al., 2003), being high/low growth or developed/developing countries (Benoit, 1978; 
Biswas & Ram, 1986; Değer, 1986; Dakurah et al., 2001; Lim, 1983), countries that are 
experiencing foreign-exchange constraints, and countries which are well-endowed with 
resources (Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b).   
Within the large numbers of literature studies, some researchers found a 
significantly positive effect (Benoit, 1973, 1978), while others found a significantly 
negative effect (Değer, 1986; Değer & Smith, 1983;  Kwabena, 1989; Lim, 1983; 
Rothschild, 1973), and some others even found an inconclusive effect or no effect at all 
(Biswas & Ram, 1986; Heo, 1998). 
Causality for multiple countries (Chowdhury, 1991; Dakurah et al., 2001) as well 
as for a single country (Heo, 1996, 1999; Joerding, 1986) was investigated in several 
cases to find out the direction of the relationship between defense expenditures and 
economic growth. 
2. Criticism of Emile Benoit’s Study among Literati 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate Benoit’s thesis and critically analyze its 
conclusion. His study has become one of the indispensible references for defense 
economists since it was the first that mentioned the positive defense-growth correlation. 
Benoit’s study has been criticized by others not only because of the theoretical 
underpinning of his study but also because of the methodological approach he used. 
Benoit’s main hypothesis was that defense burden is positively correlated to 
growth rates in low-developed countries (LDCs). To test this hypothesis, he studied the 
relationship between defense spending as a share of GNP and the growth rate of civilian 
GNP for 44 developing countries for the period from 1950-1965 and from 1960-1965. 
His results indicated the presence of significant positive correlation between these two 
variables for the time period of 1960-1965. Benoit (1973) concluded that higher defense 
spending was the cause rather than the effect of economic growth.  
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Benoit (1973) argued that finding the average defense burdens of 44 developing 
countries positively correlated with their growth rates over a comparable time period was  
crucial evidence for stating that the more these countries spent on defense, in relation to 
size of their economies, the faster they grew. Implications of his study show that 
expenditures may lead to growth by providing education and medical care, a decreasing 
unemployment rate, engaging in variety of public works, and scientific and technical 
innovations (also see Benoit, 1978; Karagöl & Palaz, 2004; Looney & Frederiksen, 
1986b).  
In his following study, Benoit (1978) used data for 44 developing countries 
between 1956 and 1969. He created a model by including growth rates, investment rates, 
foreign aid receipts, and certain other variables to estimate the correlation between these 
variables.1 He found that countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most 
rapid rate of growth and vice versa. Benoit wrote about his surprising results by stating 
that finding sufficient evidence to show a positive defense-growth relation was contrary 
to his expectations. 
Benoit (1978) acknowledged that some may think that reducing military expenses 
increases investment. He responded to this idea with the argument that in LDCs only a 
small percentage of the decrease in military spending went to productive investment 
while a major part of the released resources reveled away on nonproductive consumption. 
Therefore, even LDCs manage to cut down military expenditures; this action does not 
cause any significant increase in economic growth. Heo (1998) claimed that the poor 
economic performance of LDCs could be shown as an unexpected cause of reduced 
defense spending. 
According to Değer (1986), Benoit’s work did not provide a well-specified 
analytical model. Deger claimed that Benoit's econometric works depended on a single 
equation specification and thus, could not adequately account for the complex reality that 
needed to be explained. Değer (1986) claimed that; 
                                                 
1Benoit uses Spearman rank order correlation and regression analysis to find out the defense-growth 
relation in this study. 
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There are multiple conduits through which one variable affects another, 
and there are other intermediate variables that play a crucial role in the 
overall system. The interdependence of the model and multiple causations 
are absolutely crucial to see the overall picture of the defense-development 
relation.  
Değer (1986) pointed out that when direct effects like investment and indirect 
effects such as R&D and domestic savings-income ratio are considered overall, the 
negative relationship between defense spending and economic growth would be seen.  
Ball (1983) also wrote a critique about Benoit’s study in which he stated that 
“there were many problems with the way in which Benoit defined the variables he used 
and the interpretations he placed on the conclusion.” He also argued that, to understand 
the effects of the armament process on socioeconomic development, case studies of 
individual rather than multiple countries should be examined.  
Lim (1983) reexamined the Benoit’s claim with a bigger sample of 54 LDCs over 
a more recent period (1965-1973) and the results showed that defense spending was 
detrimental to economic growth. It is also worth noting that Lim’s reexamination shows 
how the data's time period may also change the results of the empirical studies. 
To conclude, even though several authors criticized Benoit’s work because of the 
model he employed or the theory he used, he deserves profound respect for creating a 
“heuristic idea” (Değer, 1986) of the various ways in which a higher military burden can 
affect economic growth, either positively or negatively. 
Benoit’s study encouraged others to contribute a series of books, papers, and 
articles which tried to criticize, revise, replicate, reanalyze and modify his results. The 
ongoing controversy within literary circles about his findings also shows that there is no 
clear-cut result for the defense-growth relationship.  
3. Turkish Literature Review 
The effects of defense expenditures on economic growth have been studied 
extensively in Turkey as well. Various methodologies were used to analyze the 
relationship between defense spending and economic growth. However, the findings of 
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each study also differed from one another. Economists could not find a consensus answer 
to the question of how and in what respects defense expenditures influence economic 
growth in Turkey. A small portion of previous studies and results on the Turkish case is 
presented to show how results may change depending on the time period and model 
applied. 
Sezgin (1997) investigated Turkish defense spending and economic growth 
between 1949 and 1993 using a ‘Feder-type model’ with human capital and found that 
defense expenditures had a positive effect on economic growth. Özsoy (2000) also 
applied the same model for a different period and did not obtain a significant effect of 
defense spending on Turkish economic growth. Following that, Sezgin (2000) and Dunne 
et al. (2001) analyzed the existence of a relationship between defense spending and 
growth using a Granger causality test. In contrast to Sezgin (2000), Dunne et al.’s 
findings revealed that defense expenditures adversely affected economic growth. Sezgin 
(2001) estimated defense-growth relationships between the years 1956 and 1994 via a 
‘Değer Model’ and found a positive impact of defense on economic growth, but no 
significant effect on savings and the balance of trade. Yildirim and Sezgin (2003) 
reported that defense spending enhanced economic growth by raising aggregate demand 
in Turkey. They analyzed the effects of military expenditures on employments. The 
empirical findings suggested that military expenditures impeded employment both in the 
short run as well as the long run. Karagöl and Palaz (2004) used a series of unit root, 
cointegration and causality tests to make certain the direction of the causality between the 
growth of GNP and defense expenditures in Turkey for the period between 1955 and 
2000. They concluded that there was a long-run equilibrium relation between GNP and 
defense expenditures. According to their short-run causality test, they found 
unidirectional causality between variables, from defense expenditures to economic 
growth.  
In addition to a defense-growth relationship, defense-welfare tradeoffs for Turkey 
have also been investigated. In one of those studies, Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) found 
that the tradeoff between defense and health is negative while it was positive between 
defense and education. Also, the tradeoff between defense and budget deficits for Turkey 
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was examined by Günlük-Şenesen (2003), and he concluded that his results did not 
confirm the presence of such a tradeoff. In a follow-up study, Günlük-Şenesen and 
Sezgin (2003) tried to explore the debt tradeoff of defense in Turkey for the period 
between 1980 and 2000. They concluded that Turkish arms imports did not have a 
contributing effect on external debt for the examined period. However, the results were 
not strongly significant.  
The arms race between Turkey and Greece has been one of the major topics of 
defense economics literature regarding Turkey. Various aspects of the arms race have 
been studied in many articles by several Turkish and Greek defense economists by using 
several empirical modeling techniques. Little evidence has been found in favor of an 
arms race between the two countries, despite a considerable amount of research (see 
Brauer, 2002, and references herein). 
Brauer (2002) found four major topics within defense economics literature 
regarding Greece and Turkey. He stated these four major topics in his study as follows:  
(a) is there, or was there, an arm race between Turkey and Greece? (b) 
what determines the demand for military expenditure; (c) what is the 
impact, if any, of military expenditure on economic growth in Turkey and 
Greece; and (d) what is the nature, extend, and impact of indigenous arms 
production in these countries? 
Some of the studies, which have estimated a military expenditure demand 
function, claimed that Turkish and Greek defense allocations are strongly influenced by 
each other’s military spending (Kapopouos & Lazaretou, 1993; Kollias, 1994; 1995; 
Sezgin & Yildirim, 2002; Yildirim & Sezgin, 2003). Empirical results varied from one 
study to the next depending on the time period used and the methodology employed by 
the studies; such studies included those by Majeski (1985), Refenes et al. (1995), 
Georgiou et al. (1996), Kollias and Makrydakis (1997), Smith et al. (2000), Dunne et al. 
(2001), Öcal (2002), and Andreou (2000). However, there are several gaps and 
shortcomings related to the data and data sources, models, and theoretic views employed. 
Breuer (2002) also focused attention on the problem of the implementation of the 
findings as follows;  
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…whether or not the statistical results are in line with or contrary to one’s 
expectations, post hoc rationalization of one’s findings is very easy. For 
instance, suppose one found that Greek military expenditure followed 
Turkey’s. The rationalization is that Greece did not wish to fall behind 
Turkey. Now suppose the opposite case: Turkish military expenditures 
follow Greece’s. Now the rationalization is that Turkey does not wish for 
Greece to catch up. Whatever the finding, each makes ‘sense’. 
4. Related Surveys for Further Information 
Many empirical studies have been published to understand the relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth for various countries for a range of time 
periods by using assorted methods as described in this chapter. A comprehensive review 
of writings on defense-growth literature can be found in following surveys. 
Lindgred (1984) surveyed 40 reports that studied the consequences of military 
expenditures from various countries. His survey included methods and results of 
empirical studies that were carried out between 1968 and 1984. More recent studies can 
be found in Dunne (1996), who surveyed reports on 54 studies between 1973 and 1996 
that dealt with the economic effects of military expenditures in LDCs (as cited in Pool, 
2000). Moreover, Pool (2000) surveyed 93 published articles in several journals for the 
years between 1982 and 1998 to provide a synthesis of evidence regarding the 
relationship between government policies and growth. His article includes a chart 
showing the results and methods of 21 articles previously published on the defense-
growth relationship. 
B. CONCLUSION 
A large number of papers examine the relationship between growth and defense 
by using several econometric methods. Some of these econometric methods are based on 
the supply-side approach where production roles and “interrelationships” (Değer, 1986) 
are among the sectors included. An alternative demand-side approach is based on the 
Keynesian definition of aggregate demand where the output is the sum of the 
components. The next chapter of this thesis focuses on the relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth under these different approaches.  
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IV. OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP  
Defense spending has been one of the major components of government 
expenditures for both developed and developing countries. Defense burden (defense 
spending as a share of GDP) varies by country depending on the economic, social, and 
political dimensions of both domestic and international environments. For developed 
countries, an increase in defense spending raises aggregate demand which sustains higher 
national income and employment. Moreover, the affected industries may have economies 
of scale; thus a higher level of defense spending may mean lower production costs in 
addition to an increase in economic activity. Developed countries also take advantage of 
spinoff and spillover of military R&D and technology. However, for the LDCs or 
developing countries, the issue of whether higher defense spending either burdens or 
benefits the economy is more controversial. Therefore, while defense spending in 
industrialized countries has been a matter of disagreement, its effects on the development 
process of emerging economies has likewise been an issue that has seen some rather 
heated debates (Payne & Sahu, 1993). 
Although it seems to be logical to suppose that defense spending encourages 
economic growth in industrialized countries and slows down economic progress in LDCs, 
a detailed examination of the linkages between defense spending and economic growth 
shows that there may be some cases for which this intuition is not a reliable guide. In 
other words, stating that defense spending decreases growth in LDCs and developing 
countries is not universally true.  
The vast literatures on the economic effects of military expenditures suggest a 
number of different linkages between defense spending and output. They can be broadly 
grouped into supply-side effects, demand-side effects, and security effects.  
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A. DEFENSE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP 
1. The Supply-side Effects 
The neo-classical production function approach employs a supply-side description 
of chances in aggregate output (Payne & Sahu, 1993, p.20). The supply-side approach 
focuses on the opportunity cost of scarce resources. In the latter case, defense spending 
diverts scarce resources away from more productive uses; this, in turn, causes a reduction 
in civilian consumption and lowers the well-being of the society because of the reduction 
in civilian and public savings and investments. Although these arguments often suggest 
an adverse effect of defense on growth, some positive linkages can also be involved as 
spillovers. 
Hartley and Sandler (2001) summarize the supply-side model under the name of a 
Feder model as follows; 
In a seminal paper, Feder (1983) introduces a supply-side theory to 
explain economic growth that allows for an externality between sectors as 
well as inter-sectors productivity differences. Feder is interested in 
beneficial externalities stemming from the export sector, which arise from 
better management practices, embodied technology, improved techniques, 
and higher quality labor. 
Feder’s two sector analyses have received considerable attention within the 
literature. For example, Feder’s two sectors of exports and non-exports are replaced with 
the private and public sector by Ram (1986) and with military and non-military sectors by 
Biswas and Ram (1986).  
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a. Negative Effects 
Neo-classical approaches generally lead to the conclusion that defense 
expenditures lessen economic growth. The “guns-butter tradeoff”2 relegates military 
spending to an inefficient use of resources (Shieh et al., 2002, p. 443). This assumption 
(inevitably) implies that using resources for military expenditures prevents using these 
resources for economic activities such as investment, public infrastructure, and social 
programs. Since “economics is the study of choice under conditions of scarcity” 
(Lieberman & Hall, 2005, p. 1), allocation of the resources for reaching economic goals 
could be managed with fewer resources. This group claims that the opportunity cost of 
spending on defense is significant, and that pursuing other economic activities would 
make the society better off. Therefore, although defense spending increases security, it 
requires sacrifices of resources which could increase economic growth. The guns-butter 
tradeoff can manifest in budgetary natural resources and capital stock tradeoffs.  
Opportunity costs rise when resources are scarce and can be used in 
multiple ways. Commitment of government expenditures to defense leads to a shortage of 
funds for public welfare projects (Heo, 1998; Yildirim & Sezgin, 2002). Since education 
and health are major indicators of economic growth, defense spending is believed to 
lower growth by reducing both public and private expenditures for human capital 
formation. On the other hand, well-educated defense people who work in the civilian 
sector after their retirement improve the quality of human resources in the civilian sector. 
The experiences that they had in the military sector can be transmitted to other sectors of 
the economy (Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b). 
An increase in defense spending enlarges the gap between savings and 
investments by reducing potential savings available for planned investments and thus 
retarding growth (Değer, 1986). Moreover, because defense spending is a government  
                                                 
2 “Economists use the notion of a societal production possibilities frontier to illustrate concepts of 
scarcity, tradeoffs, choice, full employment, and efficiency. The classic example is to take “guns” as one 
output, and “butter” as the other. In more general terms, the guns-butter tradeoff can refer to any society’s 
more general, and real-world, choice between becoming a more militarized society (“guns”) and becoming 
a more civilian- or consumer-oriented society (“butter”).” (Goodwin et al, 2007). 
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expenditure, “each increase in defense spending brings either a heavier tax burden or a 
bigger government budget deficit or both” (Chan, 1988). Critics claim that defense 
spending is a waste of resources and crowds out valuable civil investment.  
Looney and Frederiksen (1986b) draw attention to the consequences of 
how defense spending is financed. If a substantial part of armament is imported, an 
increase in defense armament can cause a balance-of-payment problem on the economy. 
If imports are financed by external loans, the external debt rises. In the long run, a 
balance-of-payment problem generates or aggravates inflation, which reduces the 
economic competitiveness of a country. If imports are financed through export earnings, 
the opportunity cost of shifting resources to defense use should be considered. According 
to Looney and Frederiksen (1986b), this is one of the evidences “why no consistent 
relationship has emerged between growth and defense”. Moreover, Değer (1986) argues 
that analyzing the impact of the cost of armament imports as a proportion of a defense 
budget is difficult because of the lack of available data on armament imports. 
b. Positive Externalities—Spinoff and Spillovers 
Although the supply-side approach suggests an overall adverse affect of 
defense spending on economic growth, positive spillover effects of defense spending 
have nonetheless received attention in the literature reviewed for this thesis.  
The spinoff effect means a positive correlation between defense spending 
and growth (ceteris paribus) by enhancing aggregate demand and causing more 
innovations in both products and processes (Değer, 1986). Furthermore, defense 
programs provide employment, education, and vocational/technical training for a large 
number of people. Therefore, defense spending relieves the private sector’s social and 
financial burden in a significant manner (Benoit, 1973, 1978; Değer, 1986; Heo, 1996). 
For example, Air Force pilots may fly civilian planes after retirement, and health 
professionals, as well as technicians trained in the military, may also work in the private 
sector after discharge. 
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The spinoff effect is not restricted to manpower. The civilian sector also 
can receive benefits of the technology spillover. Defense R&D is seen as a means of 
promoting the growth of high technology sectors, such as aerospace and electronics, 
which in turn provides valuable spinoffs for the civilian economy. Using military 
technology in the civilian sector sustains a competitive advantage for a firm in both the 
domestic and international market. 
Military R&D, and subsequent innovations, may be used by the civilian 
sector. For example, a radar device developed under a U.S. Navy contract and then 
rejected for military use is being adopted for use in hospitals to closely monitor 
heartbeats without being attached to the skin, making it particularly useful for burn 
victims (Gold, 1990 as cited in Heo, 1998). Simultaneous usage of military technology in 
both military and civilian sectors is also possible. For example, in one Turkish Air Force 
hospital, a low pressure chamber that is used during pilot training is also used in curing 
diabetics.  
Although bombs, missiles, warships, jets, and tanks may be examples of 
“unproductive” output from defense spending, construction of various categories of 
infrastructure as well as the consumption and investment arising from defense wages, are 
not unproductive outputs (Payne & Sahu, 1993, p. 21).  
The military remains one of the most modern institutions in LDCs. Thus, 
the military might provide economic growth by modernization. That is, military defense 
may “help in creating a socioeconomic structure conducive to growth” (Chowdhury, 
1991). 
The simple definition of the peace dividend is that if governments cut their 
military expenditures, there will be greater financial resources to allocate to more socially 
desirable and productive uses of resources (Intriligator, 1996 as cited in Heo, 1998). 
However, it is not very easy to cut defense spending to gain a peace dividend for a 
country that experiences instability in both internal and external environments.   
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2. The Demand-side Effects 
Keynesians focus on defense spending as a component of aggregate demand. The 
Keynesian perspective generally assumes idle resources (i.e., labor and capital) are 
available in the economy. In an economy with unemployment, higher military spending 
increases aggregate demand which leads to increased national output and higher 
employment. On the other hand, if the economy is already at full employment, higher 
military spending might well be inflationary, or could be associated with balance of 
payment problems (Smith & Smith, 1983). However, the LDCs usually suffer from high 
unemployment and low consumption due to a lack of aggregate demand.  
Keynesian Theory concludes that the net effect of defense expenditures on growth 
is positive and “in the presence of inadequate effective demand the operation of income 
multiplier would imply an increase in national product, resulting from additional defense 
expenditures” (Looney, 1989). Additional demand and output from the defense 
expenditures will increase the utilization of capital stock while reducing resource costs, 
thereby increasing the rate of profit and possibly accelerating investment as well as 
employment of labor (Looney, 1994). Therefore, the economy will experience both a 
short-run multiplier effect now and higher rate of growth in the future (Değer, 1986).  
One can divide these positive effect advocates into two sub-groups based on the 
nature of causality. The Keynesian view advocates causality from government 
expenditure to economic growth while Wagner’s Law3 implies a reverse direction of 
causality (see also Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2003). 
3. Security Effects 
Adam Smith, (as cited in Dunne et al., 2003), notes that the first duty of states is 
“that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent 
societies…that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the 
injustice or oppression of every member of it.”  
                                                 
3 “Wagner’s Law states that the development of an industrial economy will be accompanied by an 
increased share of public expenditure in GNP.”  (Wagner’s Law, 2007). 
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Another positive side of military expenditures is a safe environment for members 
of the society. Security from domestic and foreign threats is crucial for investment and 
innovation. A safe environment encourages both foreign and domestic investments, and 
therefore stronger economic growth (Benoit, 1973; Değer, 1986). A strong military will 
also provide a stronger position for national leadership in negotiating with other countries 
in economic, trade or security matters (Ram, 1993 as cited in Heo, 1998).  
However, defense spending can have negative international externalities, perhaps 
resulting in an arms race.  
The Richardson model shows that states arm in response to the threats 
they believe to come from rival states. A state will increase its defense 
spending in response to the higher military spending of its rivals and that 
its response is also affected by grievance and fatigue or economic factor 
(Richardson, 1960 as cited in Hartley et al., 1993, p. 40).  
Another argument on the security effects of defense spending is about causality, 
namely if defense expenditures are exogenous to economic growth (Heo, 1996). If there 
is a positive correlation between defense spending and economic growth, the direction of 
causality between these variables may vary. An increase in economic performance may 
reveal a need for an increase in military expenditures to reinforce the county’s economy 
and therefore guarantee the protection of the national economy against internal and 
external threats.  
The level of defense spending depends on how threatened the government feels 
and how much the government is willing to pay (or can afford to sustain) for the desired 
level of security. Therefore, the effects of defense spending depend also on security 
policy, fiscal policy, and foreign policy.  
4. What Makes the Economic Effects of Defense Spending Different? 
Defense spending has been an important component of government expenditures 
both for developed countries and LDCs. The economic effects of defense spending in 
each type of country differ. An increase in defense spending implies a rise in aggregate 
demand for the developed countries. An increase in demand is met by an increase in 
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production of goods and services which causes higher income and employment in the 
economy of the developed countries. Military R&D and spillover may also increase 
private sector productivity. On the other hand, for the developing countries, an increase in 
defense spending most likely takes resources away from productive investments. Defense 
demand in many developing countries is met by imports. Import-oriented defense 
technology can not use the advantage of the spillover that could have favorable effects on 
the economy (Payne & Sahu, 1993, p. 3). 
However, the effects of military spending on economic growth are not consistent 
among LDCs. As an example, Chowdhury (1991) tried to find “reciprocal influences” 
between defense spending and economic growth for the 55 LDCs. Instead of a cross- 
sectional approach across countries, he analyzed time series of each individual country, 
seeking presence and direction of causal relationship among the variables. The results 
suggested that the relationship between economic growth and defense spending can not 
be generalized across the developing countries. He concluded, “The actual relationship 
may vary by countries due to the use of sample periods, to differences in socioeconomic 
structure and type of government in each of these countries.” According to Heo (1998), 
there could be three factors that make a difference in terms of the economic effects of 
defense spending on growth:  
…the level of defense burden due to opportunity cost, economic 
prosperity due to the nation’s economic capacity to handle the opportunity 
cost, and regime type of the government due to the difference in the 
openness of the market and the level of government control over market. 
O’Leary and Coplin (1975) suggest an investigation of the economic environment 
of a country, internal political factors, external threats, military alliances, military and 
strategic factors to explain the variance of defense spending patterns (and therefore 
defense burdens) among countries. 
Frederiksen and Looney (1982) use data for the time period 1960-1978 and 
separate countries into financially resource-constrained and resource-unconstrained 
groups. They include investment and defense as independent variables for the growth 
 25
equation. They conclude that “increased defense spending fostered economic growth in 
the unconstrained group, but had little discernible effect in resource constrained 
countries” (as cited in Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b). 
Looney and Frederiksen (1986b) find out that “increased military expenditures 
retard growth in countries which are experiencing foreign-exchange constraints, while 
helping development in those that are relatively well endowed with resources.” They 
conclude that since some African economies have limited access to international capital 
markets and relatively poor export performance, it is not accurate to have a general 
opinion that additional defense spending has a negative impact on economic growth for 
all African countries. 
Looney (1988a) offers a broad-scope econometric analysis that includes data from 
77 LDCs. He indicates that the economic environments of arms producers differ from 
those of non-producers. Therefore, he analyzed countries in two groups by distinguishing 
arms producers and non-producers. His results show that military burden does not appear 
to have a significant impact on these LDCs as a whole. Both the impact of military 
expenditures on various aspects of the economy and priorities in military budget vary 
between these two different groups of countries. 
Looney (1988b) argues that “budgetary ‘trade-offs’ provide additional evidence 
that increase spending on defense tends to improve the general ‘quality of life’ in non-
conflict states and to reduce it in others [conflict states].”4 He also states that additional 
defense spending may have a different impact on each country, depending on how much 
of a portion of the defense expenditures is afforded to health and education. 
Regime types also make a difference in the economic effects of defense spending. 
For example, “military regimes may have tighter controls over markets and be less open 
to trade, whereas more democratic governments adopt free market principles and open 
trade policy” (Heo, 1998). Disbursement and spending of a defense budget, and therefore 
                                                 
4 Looney (1988b) uses Robert Rothstein’s ‘Legitimacy-Threats Matrix for Developing Countries’ to 
define the non-conflict and conflict states. “Non-conflict states are defined as those with medium to high 
levels of governmental effectiveness and/or low threats. Conflict states are defined as those with low 
governmental effectiveness.” 
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efficiency and effectiveness of defense spending, may change depending on the regime 
type of a country. However, Heo (1998) found no systematic pattern in the relationship 
between regime type and the economic effects of defense spending on growth. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Defense expenditures have advantages and disadvantages as policies to promote 
economic growth. The neoclassical approach states that the opportunity cost of defense 
spending is significant and diverts scarce resources away from more productive uses. 
Defense expenditures can hinder growth through a crowding-out of investment or civilian 
programs such as health spending and infrastructural improvement. The defense burden 
affects economic growth directly through increased demand, technological spinoff, and 
modernization of attitudes, and indirectly through increased supply of skilled labor and 
decreased investment. Also, military spending can encourage economic growth through 
Keynesian aggregate demand effects. Growth in demand due to defense spending leads to 
an increase in the utilization of capital stock, greater employment and profits, and 
therefore greater investment. Defense spending also sustains a more favorable security 
environment that is crucial for the efficient operation of civilian markets, such as 
consumer, industrial, and stock markets. The level of defense spending for sustaining a 
secure environment requires security, fiscal, and political policies. 
The question of the net benefit of defense expenditures on growth has important 
policy implications, especially for developing countries.  However, past research strongly 
indicates there is no universal answer.  Accordingly, an empirical study in this thesis will 
focus on Turkey as its case study.  
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V. DIFFICULTIES OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE STUDIES 
Empirical studies on military expenditures have important policy implications, 
since each country spares a considerable amount of budget share for defense. As 
explained in Chapter IV of this thesis, consequent effects of the level of military 
expenditures differ by countries depending on various factors. Military expenditures 
themselves may also cause a different result. There are several difficulties that 
researchers of military expenditures deal with. In this chapter firstly, existent conceptual 
(definition), methodological, and practical (collecting) difficulties in the collecting and 
processing of statistical data on military expenditures are stated. Secondly, the primary 
source of information on military expenditures and how existing problems affect these 
sources are explained. After that, the measures of military expenditures are displayed. 
Being aware of all these difficulties may prevent wrong implications. It is important to be 
able to measure military expenditures correctly, if possible, because the results of defense 
economics studies may affect the regional force balance. If not, knowing the deficiencies 
and constraints of studies becomes crucial before making any policy implementation.  
A. CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS  
1. Problem in the Definition of Military Expenditures 
Military expenditures would be defined, in a simple way, as being all the human 
resources and material dedicated by a country to its defense “[first] to guarantee its 
national independence, the integrity of its territory and, where appropriate, the respect of 
the international treaties binding to country to foreign states [secondly] to maintain 
internal security and public order” (Herrera, 1994, p. 13). Even this simple definition 
requires separation of resources employed by a state to maintain security from all other 
resources used for other governmental expenditures. However, separating each 
governmental expenditure into military and civilian categories is not easy because of 
intertwined military and civilian functions of the state.  
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“The definition of military expenditures may vary considerably from one county 
to another due to differences in classification and accounting and in the way in which the 
state budget is drawn up” (Herrera, 1994, p. 14). In some countries, the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Defense includes some civilian activities. For example, besides its 
responsibility for armed forces, the Ministry of Defense of Saudi Arabia is responsible 
for the civil aviation authority and for meteorological services. Conversely, there may be 
civilian-budgeted expenditures that benefit the military sector. For example, research and 
development expenditures in the nuclear and space fields are financed by the civilian 
sector; however, some applications of these sectors are directly military related (Herrera, 
1994, p. 14). Moreover, the role of the armed forces changes in some countries. For 
example, as in the French gendarme, job discrimination between police and armed forces 
is not certain (Giray, 2004). 
Each country is free to define its military expenditures on behalf of its benefit; 
hence there is no standard definition (Brzoska, 1995 as cited in Lebovic, 1999). There are 
three basic definitions of military expenditures (see Appendix B). The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United 
Nations (UN) have developed standardized definitions which are used by some other 
institutes and agencies that have database on military expenditures. The main differences 
among the definitions include the following: ambiguity on whether or not the treatment 
of external military aid should be included or excluded from military expenditures; 
financing of military pensions which is included in the NATO definition but not the IMF 
definition; ambiguity on expenditures pertaining to security forces like gendarme and 
border guards which are parts of military force and participants of civilian security tasks; 
research and development expenditures (see also Brzoska, 1995, pp .46-49 as cited in 
Giray, 2004; Herrera, 1994, pp. 15-16).  
A lack of a standard definition of military expenditure creates variance in military 
expenditure figures. For example, military expenditures in the German national budget is 
estimated as DM 49,602 for the year of 1993, however when the NATO definition is 
applied this number increases to DM 63,853 (Brzoska, 1995, pp. 51-52 as cited in Giray, 
2004).  
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2. Methodological Problems 
Inflation and domestic currency vary from one country to another over time; thus, 
some methodological problems are revealed in statistical studies which include data over 
time and by country. Inflation and currency variances require estimating military 
expenditures in real terms and converting the expenditures expressed in national currency 
into a common currency, generally U.S. dollars. Therefore, choosing an appropriate 
deflator and conversion factor are the two important methodological problems 
encountered in comparing military expenditures.  
a. Deflator Factor 
Inflation is defined as the increase in the price of some set of goods and 
services in a given economy over a period of time. Deflator is a statistical tool used to 
convert current dollars into inflation-adjusted currency in order to compare prices over 
time after factoring out the overall effects of inflation (Investor Words Financial 
Glossary). Some deflators should be used to compare military expenditures of different 
years. 
Inflation is valid for the price increase for a certain amount and quality of 
goods over a time period. However, price increases due to increased technology and 
therefore quality is quite possible, especially for weapon systems. This quality increase 
must be separated from actual inflation (Brzoska, 1981). This argument reveals the 
requirement of separating price increases into two components, namely inflation and 
quality increase. Brzoska (1981) acknowledges that it is impossible to manage this 
separation because of the difficulty of comparing quality change in military products as 
well as in military personnel productivity. He also points out another problem as follows; 
“inflation in the military sector outpaces inflation in the civil sector.” also In addition, he 
acknowledges that for this reason a specific country (Western Germany) used a special 
military inflation index rather than an industrial production index.  
 30
b. Conversion Factor 
The economic data of different countries that is expressed in units of 
national currency can be compared by using the international transaction approach (i.e., 
market exchange rate) or the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach. Each approach is 
generally used to convert the GDP into a common unit. However, each approach has 
weaknesses that cause loss of reliability. Market exchange rate “turns out to be an 
unsatisfactory solution for many purposes – primarily because exchange rates reflect so 
many more influences than the direct price comparisons that are required to make volume 
comparisons” (Schreyer & Koechlin, 2002). The market exchange rate does not reflect 
the prices of non-traded goods. For the second approach, “PPPs are price relatives, which 
show the ratio of the prices in national currencies of the same good or service in different 
countries” (Schreyer & Koechlin, 2002). PPP provides volume comparisons. Using PPP 
as a conversion factor requires the separation of each component of military 
expenditures. For example, “for military personnel, the parities can be estimated on the 
basis of the remuneration paid and the total cost of maintaining the armed forces, by 
ranks and status weighted by total numbers, in comparison with the corresponding costs 
in other countries” (Herrera, 1994, p. 18). However, there is not sufficient and accurate 
data related to military expenditures. The main discrepancy of PPP is that PPP numbers 
can vary with a specific basket of goods which may differ in their contribution to welfare 
in each county.  
Local prices differ from international prices due to various national taxes 
and regulations. Therefore, the exchange rate approach can be dependable for tradable 
goods but not for all domestic foods. Although PPP has weaknesses that limit its value, 
PPP is preferred over the exchange rate approach in statistical studies.   
Brzoska (1981) argues that applying a deflator for the inputs of military 
expenditures provides a correction of the military sector output to real time series. If the 
main concern is about the opportunity cost of military expenditures rather than the output 
of military expenditure inflation, characteristics on those alternative sectors should be 
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known. “Theoretically two issues must be considered here: 1. Can we estimate where 
milex money would be spent alternatively? 2. Does the composition of possible 
alternative uses of milex change from year to year?” (Brzoska, 1981) 
3. Problems in Collecting Data 
The secret nature of the military expenditures creates a significant data confidence 
problem. “In the great majority of countries, if not all of them, information concerning 
questions of national defense is surrounded by opaqueness, symptomatic of the eminently 
political nature of this subject” (Herrera, 1994, p. 23). Secrecy is preferred over 
opaqueness because it prevents information for existing or potential opponents. The level 
of military expenditures or change in military expenditures can be regarded as an 
indicator of government intent; therefore governments may want to hide their level of 
armament. Also, some countries “might understate spending to calm adversaries and 
domestic critics” (Brzoska, 1981). Due to this strategic dimension of military 
expenditures, “opacity” is a desired action for many countries. Consequently, some 
countries manipulate foreign trade accounts to disguise the purchasing of weapons by 
identifying those expenditures as purchases of capital goods for the civilian sector (Ball, 
1988 as cited in Herrera, 1994). However, the strategic importance of the defense budget 
should not be overestimated, since even if the budgeted cost is known, it does not give 
explicit information whether or not a country has a defensive or offensive defense 
strategy (Herrera, 1994, p. 39). Moreover, objective information on military spending can 
help to decrease international tension by preventing conflict. Transparency in military 
issues is a crucial element for building thrust among countries. Transparency should be 
sustained not only for quantity but also for quality of information. Overall military 
spending may not be very useful, so including detailed information of defense spending 
on things such as personnel, equipment, R&D, operations and maintenance, and so on 
would be preferred.  
There may be some missing military data for some countries for some periods. 
The reason may be because some countries do not keep track of detailed military 
expenditure data or do not want to share this information. However, excluding those 
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countries due to incomplete data is not a preferable method while making international 
comparisons. Creating a dummy variable is a general method to complete the missing 
data. “Usually, the most recent available figure for military burden was applied to the 
current level of GNP, sometimes a subsequent figure was used as a best guess and 
occasionally, missing years were interpolated when there had been a big change” (Dunne 
& Perlo-Freeman, 2003).  
4. Conclusions 
Military expenditures as a figure are an input measure which shows how much is 
spent for military purposes. However, military expenditure as a figure does not provide 
any information about the quality, strength, or capabilities that can be considered as 
output measures. Applying a cost-benefit analysis to sustain the cost-effectiveness 
changes the level of output independently from the input measures of money spent. 
However, a military expenditure figure can be used to estimate the opportunity cost, 
‘gun-butter tradeoff’, or its effect on the overall economy as explained in Chapter IV of 
this thesis.  
Different definitions, price deflators, and choice of exchange rates make the 
international comparison difficult and the available data less reliable. Moreover, only 
limited data is available for some countries because of secrecy applications which 
magnify the reliability problem on available data. The reliability problem should be taken 
under consideration before making any predictions or implications by the researchers, 
since the usage of misleading measures creates bias and error. All of these differences 
add up to very large error margins. Using inappropriate data may cause two types of 
errors in a statistical decision process, namely finding a relationship where it does not 
exist (i.e., Type II error; not rejecting a false null hypothesis) or rejecting the relationship 
incorrectly where it exists (i.e., Type I error; rejecting a true null hypothesis).  
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B. PRIMARY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY 
EXPENDITURES 
Increased interest in defense economics in an environment of conceptual, 
methodological, and practical difficulties has brought about the requirement of gathering 
together and adjusting military expenditure data for each country. Several national and 
international organizations and institutes collect, process, and publish data on military 
expenditures for many countries over time. The best known of these organizations are the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA or ACDA), the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS), the International Money Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Each organization has a different focus area and uses a different approach in 
collecting, processing, and publishing data. To provide a general idea on variance, for 
example, ACDA uses the NATO definition of military expenditures whereas SIPRI uses 
its own definition. SIPRI uses the consumer price index (CPI) as a deflator for inflation 
correction whereas ACDA uses the GNP price index. IISS and SIPRI present very recent 
data; however, more than a full year passes for the latest available data to be published 
for the ACDA. Compared with SIPRI and ISS, ACDA uses more caution in presenting 
recent figures (Brzoska, 1981). IISS publishes figures for a limited number of countries, 
whereas ACDA does not present national currency figures. Both SIPRI and ACDA report 
data for calendar rather than fiscal yeas.  
Each organization publishes its available data under a different title (Table 3). 
However, many countries publish their data-related military expenditures via various 
governmental and statistical agencies and institutes.  
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Organization Title of Publication
IMF Government Finance Statistics
UN Report of the Secretary General
SIPRI World Armament and Disarmament
USACDA World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
IISS Military Balance
CIA World Factbook
Note: Titles of publications are collected from each organization's official web page
TABLE 3 Organizations and Their Publications Related to Statistical Data on 
Military Expenditures
 
Table 3.   Organizations and Their Publications Related to Statistical Data on Military 
Expenditures 
Lebovic (1999) examined the reliability of the direction of military spending 
growth obtained from ACDA and SIPRI sources for the seven different regions (Africa, 
East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, South Asia, NATO Europe, and the Warsaw 
Pact) and concluded that  
The direction of ACDA and SIPRI estimates diverge significantly over 
time and that the two data sources appear especially challenged when 
estimating the sign of smaller, and especially negative, growth-rate 
changes and of spending in regions (Africa and the Middle East) where 
growth rates vary markedly.” Herrera (1994) argues that “the use and 
value of their statistics may be seen as complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive… [therefore], it is impossible [and not right] to rely on 
any one particular database.   
An examination of each organization’s regulation and publications, as well as 
previous analyses by Brzoska (1981), Herrera (1994), and Lebovic (1999) are highly 
recommended for a detailed comparison and explanation on collecting, processing, and 
publishing data variances on military expenditures. 
C. MEASURES OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
There are different options to choose from for comparing military expenditure 
figures. Military expenditure can be measured as a level depending on the change in the 
figures. Examining levels of spending has the disadvantage of auto-correlation which 
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means previous levels of spending largely determine future spending. However, advance 
statistical methods can overcome this drawback. Annual changes may also be used to find 
out the determinants of defense spending.  
Absolute and relative measures are commonly used. An absolute level of military 
expenditure shows the actual sum of defense-related spending. An absolute measure is 
more preferable for comparative analysis in common currency and military potential 
analyses. However, using absolute measures creates some discrepancies; firstly, it is 
independent from economic capacity and size of the population. Secondly, using absolute 
measures requires using a deflator, and using a deflator creates methodological problems 
as previously described in this chapter.  
Relative defense expenditures are more frequently used than absolute measures. 
“Shares have the advantage that they take account of incomes, are insensitive to inflation 
and exchange rates, and can be used as signal or a measure of commitment to defense” 
(Smith, 1989 as cited in Georgious et al., 1996). The most common relative indicators are 
as follows: 
• Armed forces per person 
• Military expenditure as a percent of GDP (i.e., defense burden) -  
measures the portion of a country's overall economy that is devoted to 
defense 
• Military expenditures as a percent of governmental expenditures (i.e., 
budget ratio) - measures the portion of a government expenditure that is 
devoted to defense 
• Military expenditures in dollars per capita - measures how much a country 
devotes to defense relative to the size of its population 
• Military expenditures per military member - measures how much a 
country devotes to defense relative to the size of its military population  
Defense burden and budget ratio have been commonly used to measure defense 
spending in the literature. Although each measure has deficiencies, the one that should be 
selected depends on the study’s objective. “Ball (1984) argues that if the researcher is 
interested in budget allocation and hence government priorities, then the relevant measure 
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is the budget ratio. On the other hand, if the researcher is interested in the effects of 
defense spending on economic development, then the relevant measure is the defense 
burden” (as cited in Kwabena, 1992).  
The most commonly used burden measure is the military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. It indicates the burden that defense places on the economy of each 
country, automatically adjusting for differences in national income. Besides this, it 
measures a country's overall level of effort, regardless of how it allocates its defense 
budget. 
It is also worth to say that participation in peacekeeping missions, contributions to 
reaction forces, and economic assistance to some particular union are some other 

















VI. EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY 
A. TURKISH DEFENSE-GROWTH AND DEFENSE-WELFARE 
TRADEOFFS 
1. Theory and Model 
The literature on the negative effects of defense spending focuses on two kinds of 
tradeoffs - the growth tradeoff (‘guns versus growth’ tradeoff) and the defense-welfare 
tradeoff (the ‘guns versus butter’ tradeoff). The opportunity cost of military expenditures 
in terms of economic growth is measurable in the tradeoff between military expenditures 
and investment. The growth effect hypothesis states that increased defense spending 
limits the resources that might otherwise go to investment, and therefore reduces 
economic growth. The allocation effect, on the other hand, implies that military 
expenditures lead to fewer resources for welfare programs such as education and health. 
The association between investment, borrowing, military expenditures, and 
economic growth is investigated in the first part of this empirical study. To test the 
impacts of military expenditures on economic growth in Turkey, the following growth 
model is developed. 
143210 εααααα +++++= DUMMILEXEBGSPFIGGDPC tttt          (1) 
where 
GGDPC = growth rate of gross domestic product per capita, 
PFI = public total fixed investment as a share of gross domestic product 
EBGS = external balance on goods and services as a share of gross domestic product 
MILEX = military expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (defense burden 
ratio) 
DUM = dummy variable(s) (if needed) 
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The growth rate of GDP per capita is chosen as the dependent variable. Levels of 
GDP per capita are obtained by dividing annual nominal GDP at current market prices by 
the population. It is a basic economic growth indicator and measures the level and extent 
of total economic output.  The growth in GDP per capita reflects changes in the total 
production of goods and services. The growth rate was used to eliminate the inflation 
effect. PFI is chosen as an indicator of investment and the associated coefficient is 
hypothesized to be positive. The external balance term makes sense, with larger capital 
inflows as the growth rate increases. External balance on goods and services is the 
difference between exports of goods and services and imports of goods and services. If it 
is positive, the economy exports more goods and services than it imports, and vice versa. 
EBGS is chosen as an indicator of borrowing, and the coefficient is hypothesized to be 
negative since Turkey has an import-oriented economy. Lastly, the military expenditure 
as share of GDP is used to measure the portion of the overall economy that is devoted to 
defense and the coefficient is hypothesized to be negative. The proportion of each 
independent variable in GDP was taken to eliminate the inflation effect and avoid using a 
deflator as well as methodological problems discussed in Chapter V. A dummy variable 
is needed to account for some event or structural change, which will be introduced later 
in this chapter, that if not recognized will distort the size of the coefficients. 
The direction and level of the budgetary tradeoff between military expenditures 
and health and education for Turkey is investigated in the second part of the empirical 
study. The main argument suggests that education and health are among the major 
sources of economic growth, especially for developing countries. Within the limited 
budget of a country, increases in military expenditure will cause an equivalent decrease in 
other budget categories like education and health.  In other words, total budget 
expenditures might not increase with increased defense expenditures (Günlük-Şenesen, 
2002). Military expenditures are thought to reduce public expenditures on human capital 
formation, therefore limiting the economic growth (Yildirim & Sezgin, 2002). However, 
defense spending may contribute to human capital formation in education and health 
(Ram, 1993). Furthermore, defense programs provide employment, education, and 
vocational/technical training for a large number of people. Therefore, defense spending 
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relieves the private sector’s social and financial burden significantly (Benoit, 1973, 1978; 
Değer, 1986; Heo, 1996). In addition, some argue that there is no tradeoff between 
military expenditures and economic growth (David & Chan, 1990; Frederiksen & 
Looney, 1994). The direction and level of budgetary tradeoff between military 
expenditures and health and education for Turkey is investigated under the following 
equations.  
 23210 εββββ ++++= DUMMLXEDUHESS ttt      (Health equation)            (2) 
 33210 εχχχχ ++++= DUMMLXHESSEDU ttt     (Education equation)       (3) 
where 
HESS = health and social security expenditure as a share of the consolidated budget 
EDU = education expenditure as a share of the consolidated budget 
MLX = military expenditures as a share of the consolidated budget 
DUM = dummy variable(s) (if needed) 
The proportion of each independent and dependent variable in the budget were 
taken once again to eliminate inflation. A dummy variable is needed to avoid distortion in 
the size of the coefficients due to an event that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
2. Data and Method 
The association between investment, borrowing, military expenditures, and 
economic growth is investigated for the period between 1969 and 2004. Data for the 
model in Equation (1) came from several sources. Defense expenditures as a share of 
GDP data were taken from various issues of SIPRI Yearbooks (The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute). Public total fixed investment as a share of gross 
domestic product data was obtained from the SPO5 (State Planning Organization of 
                                                 
5 It is noted that based on the Turkish SIS (State Institute of Statistics) new GNP series were used after 
the year 1987 in this data set. 
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Republic of Turkey). The growth rate of gross domestic product per capita as well as the 
external balance on goods and services as a share of gross domestic product data were 
taken from the World Bank database.  
For the second part of the empirical study, data for the budget shares of health6, 
education7, and military expenditures8 are taken from Turkish Ministry of Finance 
General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control database. The data covers the period 
between 1973 and 2005.  
Data consistency for Turkey is hard to achieve, even for a short period of time 
(Günlük-Şenesen, 2002; Yildirim & Sezgin, 2002). The military has high schools, 
academies at the university and postgraduate levels, and war colleges at the postgraduate 
and higher levels. All of the military education institutions give certificates and diplomas 
which are approved by the Turkish Ministry of Education. In this context, some part of 
the money spent on the military goes directly to education, whereas these expenditures 
are not included in education spending but rather in military spending.  
Education and health expenditures are mixed in Turkey. University hospitals are 
included in education but provide a health service. Therefore, some part of the health 
expenditures of these university hospitals are counted as educational expenditures.  
Also, the military has hospitals which serve not only military personnel and their 
families but also civilians. Some parts of the military budget directly go for health but are 
counted as part of military expenditures.  
                                                 
6 Allocated budget share of the Ministry of Health of Turkey was taken as health expenditures. The 
Ministry of Health of Turkey was named the Ministry of Health and Social Security until the year 1990 in 
the consolidated budget reports.  
7 Allocated budget share of the Ministry of National Education of Turkey was taken as education 
expenditures. The Ministry of Education was named the Ministry of National Education, Youth Affairs and 
Sports until the year 1990 in the consolidated budget reports. 
8 For the years between 1973 and 1984, the defense budget was the sum of the Turkish Ministry of 
National Defense and Turkish General Command of Gendarmerie. For the years after 1984, the Turkish 
Coast Guard Command, whose budget was separate from the Turkish General Command of Gendarmerie 
and was added to the consolidated budget as a new allocated area, was added to compute the overall 
military expenditure. The budget does not include extra-budgetary figures such as the Under-Secretariat for 
the Defense Industry (SSM) Support Fund and The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF). 
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To find the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, a 
multiple regression method is applied using Excel’s Analysis ToolPak (Data Analysis). In 
the first model in Equation (1), military intervention (coup d’état) has to be controlled 
which creates an outlier in the data in 1980 for all three independent variables - PFI, 
EBGS, and MILEX. After inspection of the residuals, DUM80 is included in the analysis 
which takes the value of 1 for the year 1980 and 0 for other years. 
Whether the government is civilian or military and whether there is peace or 
tension may cause variances in the allocation of resources among budget items. In the 
second model (Equations (2) and (3)) there is a data outlier in 1983, when the military 
returned the government back to civilian control, for the variables of education and 
military. A detailed inspection of the budget allocation among institutions concurs with 
the outlier. The planned budget in the beginning and at the end of each year, and actual 
expenditure at the end of the year are very close for all years except 1983. Actual 
expenditure for the Ministry of Defense is 18% lower than the beginning budget of the 
year 1983. On the contrary, the ending budget for the Ministry of National Education is 
33% higher than the beginning budget of the year 1983. It is also very interesting that 
18% of the Ministry of Defense budget is almost equal to 33% of the Ministry of 
Education budget for that year. It seems as if civilian authority transported the budget 
from defense to education after taking control. Consequently, to control this event, 
DUM83 is included for both Equation (2) and Equation (3), which takes the value of 1 
for the year 1983 and 0 for other years.   
3. Findings 
Multiple regression output from Excel’s Analysis ToolPak for the growth model 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 343.009 85.752 9.849 0.0000
Residual 31 269.906 8.707
Total 35 612.915
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value One-tail P-value
Intercept 3.435 3.225 1.065 0.295 0.147
PFI 0.448 0.343 1.305 0.200 0.100
EBGS -1.362 0.239 -5.702 0.000 0.000
MILEX -2.053 0.723 -2.838 0.008 0.004
DUM80 -12.238 3.158 -3.875 0.001 0.000
TABLE 4 Summary Output for the Growth Model in Equation (1)
 
Table 4.   Summary Output for the Growth Model in Equation (1) 
Since the F-Statistic for the F-test of overall equation significance is 9.849 with a 
p-value of 0.0000, this model has statistically significant explanatory power at any 
significance level one would usually test. R Square denotes the coefficient of 
determination. The 2R value is 0.56 which means that just over half of the variation in 
GGDPC over these 36 observations is explained by the variation in the following 4 
variables: PFI, EBGS, MILEX, and DUM80.9 Using the 36 observation data set, all of 
the exploratory variables have the expected sign - MILEX and EBGS have negative 
coefficients whereas PFI has a positive coefficient. Coefficients with the related p-
values10 indicates that one can conclude, at any significance test level above 0.10, if PFI 
increases by 1%, GGDPC increases by 0.448% when the other independent variables in 
the model are not changing. EBGS and MILEX are significant at any usual level of 
hypothesis testing that one can conclude, and coefficients suggest that if either EBGS or 
                                                 
9 Without using dummy variable DUM80, the 2R  is 0.34 and the PFI is insignificant with a one-tail p-
value of 0.31.  
10 Since the author makes the directional prediction for each explanatory variable before conducting 
the test, and the result goes in the hypothesized directions with the statistically significant model at any 
usual level, the author uses the one-tail p-values for deciding the level of significances.  
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MILEX increases by 1%, GGDPC decreases by 1.362% or 2.053%, respectively, when 
other variables in the model do not change. DUM80 has a significant negative 
coefficient. Other information given in Table 4 supports the findings.11 
Multiple regression output from Excel’s Analysis ToolPak for the health model in 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 12.482 4.161 35.732 0.00000
Residual 29 3.377 0.116
Total 32 15.859
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 1.5840 0.2933 5.4013 0.0000
EDU 0.3062 0.0313 9.7887 0.0000
MLX -0.1214 0.0272 -4.4685 0.0001
DUM83 -1.4912 0.3521 -4.2351 0.0002
TABLE 5 Summary Output for the Health Model in Equation (2)
 
Table 5.   Summary Output for the Health Model in Equation (2) 
The model of health in Equation (2) has statistically significant explanatory power 
at any significance level one would usually test, as the F-Statistic for the F-test of overall 
equation significance is 35.732 with a p-value of 0.0000. The 2R  value is 0.79 which 
means that 79% of the variation in HESS over the 33 observations is explained by 
variation in the following 3 variables: EDU, MLX, and DUM83.12 Under the 33 
                                                 
11 Multiple R is the square root of R square. Adjusted R square adjusts R square for the relative size of 
the number of explanatory variables (k) to the size of the sample (n).  The larger the sample size, the 
smaller the difference between R square and adj. R square. When the coefficients are divided by related 
standard error, it gives values of the related T-stats. T-tests test the validity of significance for each 
individual variable. P-values are directly related to T-stats. SS, MS values and df (degree of freedom) are 
used to determine standard error and the F-test for overall equation.  
12 Without using any dummy variable, the equation generates a significant model as well as significant 
explanatory variables. However, the 2R  value increases from 0.65 to 0.79 with adding the dummy variable 
for the year 1983.  
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observation data set, MILEX has a negative coefficient whereas EDU has a positive 
coefficient. Coefficients with the related P-values13 indicate that EDU and MLX are 
significant at any usual level of hypothesis testing (with P-values of 0.000) and one can 
conclude that if either of EDU or MLX increases by 1%, HESS increases by 0.306% or 
decreases 0.121% respectively when other variables in the model are not changing. 
DUM83 has a significant negative coefficient. 
Multiple regression output from Excel’s Analysis ToolPak for the education 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 176.413 58.804 61.667 0.00000
Residual 29 27.654 0.954
Total 32 204.067
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -3.1253 1.0373 -3.0129 0.0053
HESS 2.5073 0.2561 9.7887 0.0000
MLX 0.4319 0.0615 7.0268 0.0000
DUM83 4.1532 1.0239 4.0562 0.0003
TABLE 6 Summary Output for the Education Model in Equation (3)
 
Table 6.   Summary Output for the Education Model in Equation (3) 
The P-value of F-Statistics indicates that the education model in Equation (3) is 
significant at any level. The F-Statistic for the F-test of overall equation significance is 
61.667 with a p-value of 0.0000. The 2R  value (coefficient of determination) is 0.86 
which means that 86% of the variation in EDU over these 33 observations is explained by 
                                                 
13 The two-tail p-values (under the name of ‘P-value’ in the ANOVA output) are used to decide the 
level of significances for explanatory variables since the author could not make the directional prediction 
for each explanatory variable before conducting the test. 
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variation in the following 3 variables: HESS, MLX, and DUM83.14 Under the 33 
observation data set, MILEX and HESS have positive coefficients. Coefficients with the 
related P-values15 indicate that HESS and MLX are significant at any usual level of 
hypothesis testing (with P-values of 0.000) and one can conclude that if either of HESS 
or MLX increases by 1%, EDU increases by 2.507% or 0.432% respectively when other 
variables in the model are not changing. DUM83 has a significant positive coefficient. 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to test the relationship between military 
expenditures and economic growth in the first part, and assess the defense-welfare 
relationship in the second part of the study. A causal multiple regression method was 
applied by using Excel’s Analysis ToolPak (Data Analysis). Results for each model were 
statistically significant.  
The results of the first part of the empirical study support hypothesized linkages 
between economic growth and independent variables. The positive linkage between 
investment and economic growth supports the hypothesis that investment is an important 
determinant of growth. The external balance on goods and services has negative values 
for Turkey. Turkey imports more goods and services that it exports. Also, the model 
showed that the external balance on goods and services has a negative effect on economic 
growth in Turkey. That is, the results suggest the negative linkage between military 
expenditure and economic growth. 
Depending on the growth model results, reducing military expenditures can be 
expected to increase growth due to the negative linkage between military expenditure and 
economic growth. If more capital resources are used in the civilian economy following 
defense cutbacks, then this result is plausible. However, both external and internal 
security concerns make it difficult to decrease defense spending for Turkey. 
                                                 
14 Without using any dummy variable, the equation generates a significant model as well as significant 
explanatory variables. However, the 2R  value increases from 0.79 to 0.86 with adding the dummy variable 
for the year 1983.  
15 The two-tail p-values (under the name of ‘P-value’ in the ANOVA output) are used to decide the 
level of significances for explanatory variables.  
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In the second part of the empirical study, the defense-welfare relationship for 
Turkey was tested under the two different equations of health and education. The 
empirical findings suggest there are tradeoffs between military expenditures and welfare 
spending. However, the tradeoff between military expenditures and either health or 
education is different. While there is a negative relationship between military and health 
expenditures, the relationship is positive for education. These results support the 
hypothesis that increased defense expenditures reduce resources available for health, but 
do not crowd out education. Health expenditures imply that defense has a priority in the 
budgeting process over health expenditures. Also, the tradeoff between education and 
health is positive in both Equation (2) and Equation (3). The results should be interpreted 
carefully with knowledge of the data consistency problem stated above. 
It is interesting to note that when the dummy variable is left out of each equation 
and each model is estimated again, the coefficient of determination turns out to be a 
significantly lower number. Also, the dummy variable in each equation is significant at 
any usual level of testing. The dummy variable in the growth model in Equation (1) 
supports the idea that the effects of the three independent variables PFI, EBGS, and 
MILEX caused relatively lower economic growth in 1980 when military intervention 
took place than in other years. A negative coefficient result of the dummy variable in 
Equation (2) and positive coefficient result of the dummy variable in Equation (3) show 
that in 1983 when the civilians retook control from the military, the effect of education 
and military expenditures on health expenditures was relatively lower than the overall 
trend, whereas the effect of health and military expenditures on education expenditures 
was relatively higher.   
Now that military expenditures have detrimental effects on economic growth and 
there is a negative tradeoff between health and military expenditures, is it feasible to 
recommend that Turkey should decrease its level of military expenditures?  The next 
chapter will provide a perspective on the reasons for Turkey’s increased defense 




VII. UNDERSTANDING TURKISH DEFENSE EXPENDITURE  
Defense burden (i.e., defense spending as a share of GDP) varies by country 
depending on the economic, social, and political dimensions of both domestic and 
international environments. O’Leary and Coplin (1975) suggest an investigation of the 
economic environment of a country, internal political factors, external threats, military 
alliances, and military and strategic factors to explain the level and trend of defense 
spending of a country.  
The empirical study discussed in Chapter VI revealed that there is a negative 
tradeoff between military expenditures and both economic growth and health. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to answer the following questions:  
• What makes Turkey’s military expenditures relatively high?  
• Is it possible to draw inference that high military expenditure is a 
requirement for Turkey? 
To answer these questions, firstly, the general trend in Turkish military 
expenditures, its sources, and allocation will be displayed. The remaining part of the 
study will focus on the following factors that are predicted to be major reasons for the 
high military expenditures: strategic factors, conflict with PKK terrorism, disputes with 
Greece, the military modernization program, and the economic environment of Turkey. 
The author acknowledges that there are more factors that affect the level of military 
expenditures in Turkey; however, investigating all those variables is very difficult. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to analyze the legal or political status caused by the factors 
that will be explained, but to provide a point of view based on the information of those 
factors’ importance and significance on Turkey’s high level of military expenditures.  
A. TURKISH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
1. Turkish Defense Burden 
Turkey initiated an economical liberalization in 1980 and has experienced high 
interest and inflation rates, volatile growth rates, high unemployment rates, and high 
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fiscal deficits during its economical liberalization and privatization history. Despite its 
economic distress, Turkey has been leading in arms imports. Although defense spending 
as a percentage of the gross domestic product has varied over time, it has always been 
relatively higher than the most of the European and NATO countries. Turkey’s high-
standing defense burden had continued even in the years of economic crises (see Figure 
2).  
Absolute and relative measures are commonly used to indicate the level of 
military expenditures and make future predictions depending on trend. The absolute level 
of military expenditures shows the actual sum of defense-related spending. Relative 
defense expenditures are more frequently used than absolute measures since they can be 
used as a signal or measure of commitment to defense while disregarding the 
methodological problems (see Chapter V for detailed information).  
     Data Source: GDP growth, World Bank; Milex/GDP, SIPRI
     GNP data for the year 2006 is taken from Ministry of Finance database








































































Figure 2.   Turkish Defense Burden Ratio Versus Annual GDP Growth 1969-2006 
Figure 2 provides the Turkish defense burden ratio versus annual GDP growth for 
the period 1969-2006. The defense burden ratio (military expenditures as a percent of 
GDP) indicates the burden that defense places on the economy of a country, 
automatically adjusting for differences in national income. In addition, it measures a 
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country's overall level of effort, regardless of how it allocates its defense budget. Since it 
is a relative measure, knowing the change in each component, namely military 
expenditures as well as GDP, helps to understand the change in the defense burden. 
Figure 2 shows that Turkey had a high military burden for the years prior to 1974 with an 
average of 4.4% of its GDP. There is a considerable increase and decrease in the defense 
burden ratio in the years 1974 and 1987 respectively. Turkey steadily increased its 
defense burden ratio after 1988 until 2002. Its high-standing defense burden continued 
even in years of economic crises in 1994, 1999, and 2001. Following the year 2002 
Turkey decreased its defense burden ratio. 
The previous explanation makes more sense if one looks at both figures of 
defense burden ratio and GDP growth ratio in Figure 2. For example, the steady decrease 
in the defense burden ratio after the year 2002 may be due to the continuing positive GDP 
growth. One can claim by mistake that the defense burden decreased after the year 2002 
just because of continuous increase in GDP independent from military expenditures in 
real numbers.  Since the defense burden ratio is a relative number, a change in value may 
happen because of change in military expenditure or GDP or a change in both. Looking at 
the military expenditures in real numbers, besides the relative ones, may prevent 
misreading issues. 
Source : Milex/GDP; SIPRI
             Data Source: Milex/GDP = SIPRI Yearbook, GDP = TURKSTAT and SPO
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Figure 3.   Turkish Defense Burden Ratio Versus GDP 1988-2006 
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     Data Source:  SIPRI Yearbook
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Figure 4.   Turkish Defense Burden Ratio Versus Military Expenditures 1988-2006 
Looking at Figure 3 and Figure 4 concurrently reveals that the steady decrease in 
defense burden for the period between 2002 and 2005 is not only because of the steady 
increase in GDP (as seen Figure 3), but also due to the steady decrease in military 
expenditures (as seen Figure 4). These double effects caused a greater decrease in the 
relative number. However, this explanation is not valid for the year 2006. Although 
military expenditure in real numbers increased in year 2006, the decrease in the defense 
burden ratio continued due to a relatively higher effect of GDP growth in that year. 
2. Turkish Defense Sources and Allocation 
Sources of funds to meet Turkish military expenditures include the Ministry of 
National Defense budget, the Turkish Defense Industry Fund, the income from the 
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, income derived from the sale of surplus equipment, 
services, or other goods earmarked for the Ministry of Defense, and funds allocated by 
the Undersecretary for Treasury for loan payments, the General Command of 
Gendarmerie budget and the Coast Guard Command budget. 
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Defense budgets are prepared in accordance with the State Planning Organization 
and the Ministry of Finance structures and are subject to approval by the General 
Assembly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Ministry of Finance supervises 
payments and contracts, and defense expenditures are subject to Ministry of Finance 
audits at the end of each fiscal year. 
The portion of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense budget in the GNP is 
about 3.6 percent on average, and around 12 percent in the Consolidated Budget (“U.S. 
Bureau of Industry and Security,” 2008). About half of the defense budget is allocated to 
the Land Forces Command with the other half divided among the Turkish General Staff, 
Ministry of National Defense, Naval Forces Command, and Air Forces Command. The 
budget does not however include extra-budgetary figures like Under-Secretariat for the 
Defense Industry (SSM) Support Fund (Sarıibrahimoğlu, 2007). 
The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF) was created to develop the 
Turkish defense industry by providing continuous financial support for future 
investments in the sector. The major source of income for the fund consists of revenues 
derived from taxes on the sale of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, along with 
taxes on the national lottery, joint gambling, and games of luck. 
3. Current Situation in Turkish Defense Expenditures  
Turkey’s military procurement consists almost exclusively of imports. The 
majority of weapons, including advanced systems, are imported from the major arms 
producers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
database, Turkey was one of the world’s fifteen major military spenders in 2006. Also, 
Turkey had the second largest defense budget (after Saudi Arabia) in the Middle East 
(“Middle East politics,” 2007). 
A steady decrease in military expenditures in real numbers since the year 2002 
seems to have shifted to an increase after the year 2005. Although Turkey reduced its 
defense budget in recent years due to economic restraints, on December 11, 2007, 
Turkey’s parliament approved a 1.7% increase for the Ministry of Defense budget for 
fiscal year 2008. Based on Ministry of Defense budget forecasts for 2009 and 2010, 
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planners expect a 2-3% increase in military budgets above the inflation rate, which is 
estimated to be around 10% each year. These percentages, however, do not reflect the 
extra-budgetary resources to be earmarked for defense in the coming two years 
(Sarıibrahimoğlu, 2007). 
The Turkish Republic’s defense policy, since its foundation, has been guided by 
Ataturk’s proverb of “peace at home, peace in the world” (“Turkey’s Defense Policy,” 
2007). However, sustaining peace dependent upon a credible military has required more 
defense expenditures for Turkey. Defense Secretary Vecdi Gönül declared that contrary 
to European countries which decreased their defense burden under 1.5 percent, it is 
impossible to decrease defense spending in the case of Turkey due to its geo-strategic 
position (“Türkiye Savunma,” 2007). Looking at the military expenditure level of 
Turkey’s immediate environment (see Table 1 in Chapter II) and the factors that will be 
explained in remaining part of this chapter will justify Turkey’s high-level military 
expenditures.  
B. STRATEGIC FACTORS 
It is a cliché to say that Turkey is a cultural and geographical bridge between the 
East and West. Historical, religious, ethnic, economic, and political cooperation make 
Turkey a Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Eastern European, Caucasian and Black Sea 
country. 
Bağcı and Bal (2004) argue that Turkey’s environment was more stable during the 
Cold War era as the Cold War has frozen the map to a large extent in the region as well 
as the globe. Central Asia and Caucasus was under the USSR control. The Balkans was 
also stable under Tito’s rule and the Cold War discipline. They acknowledge that in spite 
of the Iran-Iraq war and Arab-Israeli wars, the Cold War also froze some other problems 
in Middle East. With the end of the Cold War, all the regions around Turkey have been 
destabilized. Religious and ethnic irredentism have found a suitable ground to expand, 
which as led to the emergence of problems in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle 
East.  This has caused new tensions for Turkey (Bağcı & Bal, 2004), while letting Turkey 
find itself as a “pivotal state” in this new environment (Chase et al., 1996). In contrast to 
 53
the general decrease in defense expenditures in some parts of the world after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s defense spending kept increasing because of the instability 
and uncertainty in its region. 
Turkey was an important country for the West during the Cold War with its 
proximity to the USSR as a NATO member. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Turkey’s importance for the West seemed to decline. However, the level of threat for 
Turkey in this new environment put it in a more vulnerable situation. 
Events following the 9/11 attack and ‘war on terror’ further increased regional 
tension while underlining the importance of Turkey. Bağcı and Bal (2004, p. 127) state 
that ethnic and radical conflict around Turkey following the 9/11 attack in the Balkans, 
Caucasus, and the Middle East can be regarded as potential grounds that may grow into a 
threat to the U.S. and its allies.  
The consequences based off of the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attack shape 
the security environment of Turkey today. International relations, strategic notions, and 
the concept of threat have changed to a great extent. In addition to continuing 
conventional threats of regional and ethnic wars, non-conventional threats of terrorism 
and its sources of funding, namely drug trafficking and smuggling, have emerged as new 
risks and threats. Moreover, security is necessary for sustainable economic development, 
even though it has been more difficult to manage that security due to complexity and 
instability of the contemporary environment. Due to its geo-strategic position, Turkey’s 
policy of deterrence in pursuit of regional stability means the Turkish Government has 
maintained a high level of defense spending regardless of economic performance. 
General Hilmi Özkök, the 24th Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, stated 
the new requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces in his speech on April 20, 2005, at the 
Turkish War Colleges as follows: an “asymmetric threat”, which has emerged as a result 
of international terrorism, revealed that today’s technology is unable to prevent current 
threats and risks that are more unpredictable than in the past. Moreover, the post-Cold 
War era forced NATO to start a transformation process for its force and command 
structure. A reduction in force size and headquarters along with an increase in 
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effectiveness and efficiency are targeted. General Hilmi Özkök acknowledged that in 
parallel with the recent changes, the Turkish Armed Forces continue to renew and 
develop to reach the target of highly mobile, modular, and flexible new forces with high 
sustainability, and with the superiority of technology information and training.  Forces of 
the 21st century can then fulfill their function perfectly in any environment. He also stated 
that in this scope, most of the divisions and regiments were liquidated and converted into 
brigades and battalions. Upon reducing the military service period on July 15, 2003, the 
number of soldiers in the Army was reduced by 17 percent and border units were reduced 
by 15 percent after the organizational structure of the border units were reviewed. He also 
noted that on the date of the speech, personnel reductions totaled 150,000 and an 
additional program to reduce the number of border units by 11 percent would continue. 
General Yaşar Büyükanıt, the current and 25th Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, 
has also pointed out that the size of the Turkish Armed Forces will be decreased by 30 
percent in 2014 (Şafak, 2006).  
C. PKK TERRORISM 
The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is an armed terrorist organization which was 
placed on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations established by the U.S. Government, 
on the United Kingdom’s list of Proscribed Groups Concerned in Terrorism, and on the 
list of the European Union illegal terrorist entities. Conflict with the PKK has exacted a 
high financial drain on the national treasury. Consequently, defense spending has been 
one of the major components of the Turkish government expenditures. 
Contrary to media reports, the PKK’s ambition is not regional autonomy in 
Turkey. The PKK seeks to create an independent, communist, and ethnically pure 
Kurdish state in an area that it calls Kurdistan on territory currently under the sovereignty 
of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The chief target of the PKK's terrorism, however, has 
been Turkey. The PKK is funded by extortion, drug trafficking (particularly heroin) and 
the smuggling of illegal immigrants into Europe, and the smuggling of petroleum 
products out of Iraq into Turkey (Curtis & Karacan, 2002, p. 18).  
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1. Background and Current Situation 
PKK began its campaign of armed violence in 1984 which has resulted in some 
tens of thousands casualties. It employs force and the threat of force against civilian and 
military targets to achieve its political goals. PKK’s targets and activities, for the time 
duration between 1980 and 1995, are described as follows by the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: 
Although the PKK's primary targets have included military, economic, and 
social assets in Turkey, PKK activities have included attacks on civilians 
and diplomatic facilities, extortion, arms smuggling, and drug tracking. 
The PKK has pursed a wide range of targets and instruments in order to 
facilitate its terrorist campaign. These include attacking Turkey's tourism 
industry, economic infrastructure, educational Institutions, and teachers in 
southeast Turkey; using cyanide to poison military drinking water 
supplies; and engaging in unconventional tactics, ranging from 
assassination to drive-by shootings, burning villages and forests, and 
executing uncooperative civilians. 
By the late 1980s, violent incidents by the PKK increased to 258 in the 
first six months of 1989 from 315 for the entire year of 1988. 
[“Extraordinary Situation” (OHAL) had been declared in the southeast of 
the country in 1987. Under OHAL, security was the responsibility of the 
police and gendarmerie under local governors and the Ministry of the 
Interior. The regular military was completely excluded from the command 
structure.] By mid-1995, incidents sharply increased when Turkish 
officials estimated that about 15,000 civilian and military personnel had 
been killed by PKK violence. Finally, the Turkish government estimates 
that the conflict with the PKK has exacted a high financial drain on the 
national treasury. The government estimates that conflict with the PKK 
costs about $10 billion per year. This is particularly significant in light of 
the fact that Turkey is expected to maintain a budget deficit of about $5 
billion for 1995. The PKK had a detrimental effect on Turkish tourism in 
1994 causing a $700 million decrease in revenue from the previous year. It 
is estimated that this amount is tantamount to a 50 percent reduction in 
Turkey's expected tourism income in 1994. The PKK also targets 
investment projects under development in the southeastern region of 
Turkey. The PKK has also been conducting attacks on teachers and 
schools in southeastern Turkey. From 1984 to 1994, over 217 school 
teachers were abducted and murdered by the PKK in southeast Turkey. By 
the end of 1993, about 700 schools had to be closed because of brutal  
 56
killings of teachers and burning of the school buildings. Overall, 3,600 
schools were closed in the region, leaving nearly an estimated 100,000 
children uneducated (“The Workers’ Party,” 2008). 
The group’s scope of terrorist operations has been significantly reduced after the 
arrest of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya in 1999 (Curtis & Karacan, 2002, p. 18). 
The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in that year and changed its name to Kurdistan 
Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and then to Kongra-Gel (KGK), although 
the PKK acronym is still used by parts of the movement since it was founded in 1974 
(“Terrorism Act 2006,” 2008). It was clear that this change was aimed to protect itself 
from the legal implications of being listed as a terrorist organization.  
After August 2000, aside from a few isolated incidents, the armed conflict had 
come to a complete halt. Even so, every time the PKK finds a safe haven, it renews 
violence. However, since 2004, there has been an increase in PKK attacks on the Turkish 
military, police, and governmental targets near the Iraqi border. During the 2003-2005 
period, the total security personnel lost (203 soldiers, 21 police officers, and 22 village 
guards) was 246. The total number of personnel wounded and disabled was 147. The total 
armed militants captured were 1325 (359 dead, 377 live, 589 amnesties). The TBMM 
(Grand Assembly of Turkish Republic) report mentions growing efforts in mobilizing the 
criminal intelligence exchange. 
The very latest improvements are discussed below. The PKK declared second 
ceasefire since September 28, 2006. However, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and Chief of Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt did not recognize such a motion. 
Erdoğan was quoted as saying; "A ceasefire is done between states. It is not something 
for a terrorist organization," (“Turkish army rejects”, 2006; “Turkish PM rejects,” 2006). 
The Turkish army called for action against PKK training camps in Northern Iraq. Turkey 
has also offered an olive branch to the PKK. Amnesty has been offered to PKK members 
who have not been involved in attacks. On December 9, 2006, P.M. Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan announced he would propose legislation broadening the amnesty's reach (Fein, 
2008). 
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On September 29, 2007, PKK terrorists set up an ambush in the Beytüşşebap 
district of Şırnak. PKK used machine-gun fire on a minibus carrying 13 people. The 
assault claimed the lives of seven village guards, five construction workers, and one 
young child, while wounding two others (“Terrorists target,” 2007). In early October 
2007, PKK terrorists carried out another ambush, this time near the border with Iraq, 
killing 13 Turkish soldiers. The incident sparked renewed threats from the Turkish 
Government to cross over into Iraq to pursue the terrorists (“Turkish soldiers,” 2007). 
Incidents led to the question of whether or not the Turkish military would cross 
the border into Iraq in order to track down members of the PKK responsible for terrorist 
attacks in Turkey. On the October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament approved a military 
incursion into Iraq to pursue the PKK terrorists. The vote for incursion in the pursuit of 
PKK terrorists for a one-year period won with an overwhelming 507 to 19 by the Turkish 
Grand Assembly (“Turkey approves,” 2007). By mid-2007 around 3,500 PKK militants 
were believed to be based in Iraq (“Kongra-Gel,” 2008). Action was delayed on a request 
by the U.S. government on the condition that "swift steps" were already taken to deal 
with the rebels. Just five days later on October 22, 2007, another PKK ambush left 17 
more Turkish soldiers dead and some were taken prisoners (“Turkish troop,” 2007). 
Turkey reported that 32 terrorists were also killed in the raid (“Turks mull,” 2007). 
The Turkish General Staff declared on its official webpage that total armed 
militants captured during year 2007 was 653 (315 dead, 229 live, 109 amnesties). 
Overall, total terrorist captured with the Northern Iraq operations increased to more than 
800 during the year 2007.  
Although the 9/11 attack and the subsequent global war on terror (GWOT) further 
increased regional tension, the aftermath of the 9/11 attack was an opportunity for 
Turkey. The GWOT sustained a general acceptance towards the Turkish view of the 
threat from terrorist activities and the need for international cooperation to fight against 
terrorism. Turkish P.M. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with U.S. President George W. Bush 
at the White House on November 5, 2007, to ask for U.S. support in the fight against the 
terrorist group PKK. Bush told Erdoğan that he was committed to countering the 
terrorists and offered to share real-time intelligence with Ankara (Saygun, 2007). The 
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Turkish Government handed over authority to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) on 
November 28, 2007, to carry out a military incursion into Northern Iraq. Following that, 
On December 16, 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces started a large-scale cross-border 
attack on PKK camps situated in Northern Iraq at Kandil with Zap, Avaşin and Hakurk 
camps (“US backed,” 2007). The TSK announced on its webpage that there were no 
civilian casualties in the Turkish operations against PKK targets. Ground operations in 
Northern Iraq were the result of effective and successful military action and diplomatic 
efforts. All operations were supported internationally (Turkone, 2007). The United States 
designated the PKK-affiliated terrorist organization Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) 
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization on January 10, 2008. With this 
designation, the United States reaffirms its commitment to fight terrorism in cooperation 
with its NATO ally, Turkey. The United States will continue to work with Turkey, Iraq, 
and the rest of Europe against the PKK and its support networks and affiliates, such as 
the TAK (“US Department of State,” 2008). 
On February 21, 2008, the TSK initiated a new cross-border operation of targets 
on PKK bases in the Zap area in Northern Iraq which lasted eight days. The Chief of the 
Turkish General Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that the Turkish ground 
operations against the PKK achieved their objectives: "We needed to give them a lesson 
and we did.  We have other lessons to give. Other operations will be conducted as 
necessary. This was just a phase in the fight against terrorism" (“More attacks on PKK,” 
2008). This statement indicates that the TSK will continue its determination on the fight 
against terrorism for the year 2008.  
2. PKK and Prevention of Terrorism as an Economic Burden 
Turkey employed a stubborn, and at times, harsh policy based predominantly on 
military power first to stop the terror activities conducted by the PKK and then terminate 
the terrorist groups and their support bases. Turkish officials estimated that more than 
35,000 civilian and military personnel had been killed by PKK violence. Numerous 
Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq took place, some of which were made by huge  
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military power including thousands of soldiers supported by tanks, artilleries, helicopters 
and Air Force jets. The prevention of terrorism results in a relatively quite significant cost 
for the Turkish economy.  
Defense spending in Turkey is directly correlated with the PKK conflict. A 
decrease in defense spending from 2000 until 2005 (Table 3) could be explained partly by 
the decrease in armed conflict with the PKK. Also, the increase in defense spending after 
2005 may be explained in this context. Abdulkadir Aksu, the Turkish Minister of Internal 
Affairs, declared that Turkey spent $100 billion for the prevention of terrorism up until 
end of year 2006. Terror creates an extra burden of about $6 billion per year to the 
Turkish economy (“Terör faturası,” 2006). When the socio-cultural and cultural 
externalities are added to this number, the overall cost of terror to the Turkish economy 
becomes bigger. The report prepared by Turkish economist Mustafa Sönmez made public 
that Turkey earmarked one-third of its 2006 fiscal budget for the eastern and southeastern 
regions where Turkey had been experiencing terror problems (as cited in 
Sarıibrahimoğlu, 2007). 
The Turkish Development Bank reports that Turkey invested $429.6 billion for 
the East Anatolian (DAP) and South Anatolian Project (a.k.a. GAP) until the year 2003. 
However, the Turkish economy could not achieve the expected return from these projects 
because of the PKK’s terrorist activities within these regions. The opportunity cost of 
spent money for the prevention of terror in Turkey would accomplish 10 GAP projects or 
would pay the oil need of Turkey for 32 years. It is also equal to the total tourism receipts 
of Turkey for 13 years and the total cost of its export revenue for 3 years (Gündüzalp, 
2007).  
Although there was a significant decrease in the defense budget in the beginning 
of the year 2007 with the economizing measures (“Türkiye’nin savunma bütçesi,” 2007), 
recent increase in conflicts with PKK required a YTL5.1 billion increase in the Turkish 
Defense Ministry budget immediately with then reached almost YTL18.2 billion for the 
year 2007 (“Savunma harcamaları tırmandı,” 2007). The overall burden of terror on the 
Turkish economy, which is the total of the Defense Ministry budget plus the Gendarmerie 
Headquarter budget, for the year 2007 reached YTL22.4 billion (Uras, 2007). Therefore, 
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the defense budget became the biggest expenditure again among the governmental 
expenditures after three years by passing education expenditures (Güngör, 2007). Since 
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) is intended to root out the terrorist groups within and 
around Turkey, forecasting an increase in defense spending in year 2008 is feasible. 
3. Increased Defense Spending due to Terrorism and Its Effect on 
Economic Growth 
Defense spending has been one of the major components of the Turkish 
Government’s expenditures. Conflict with the PKK has exacted significant costs. As was 
previously explained, conflict with terror has been causing detrimental effects on various 
areas, ranging from the tourism industry to economic infrastructure and educational 
institutions of the Turkish Republic. The question of ‘if Turkey did not experience such a 
terror, would her economy be better today?’ is hard to answer. Although defense 
spending seems detrimental to economic growth at first sight, the defense-growth 
relationship may change depending on various factors as explained in Chapter IV of this 
thesis.   
Sezgin (2003) asserts that an increase in the military personnel population as well 
as ‘village guardians’ (i.e., köy korucuları) in the Southeastern Anatolian Region 
increases the income level and spending capacity of the region. An increase in the waged 
population increases the total demand.16 Consequently, the average per capita income 
differential among the regions decreased. Existence of the Turkish Armed Forces in this 
region provides positive externalities in the education and health areas. In addition to 
that, this lengthy existence accelerates infrastructural investments which are also used by 
civilians. The long time armed conflict with terrorism associated with PKK has made the 
Turkish Armed Forces more dynamic. Sezgin (2003) also claims that this better 
dynamism was interpreted as a loss of competitiveness against the Turkish Armed Forces 
by the Greece. Hence, Greece tried to first find new alliances against the Turkey, and 
then later, new ways of working together with Turkey in place of conflicting. He claims 
                                                 
16 Village guardians’ wages and other compensations are paid out of the Ministry of Interior affair 
budget. It is hard to include these expenditures in the military expenditures due to unavailability of detailed 
data (Gülük-Şenesen, 2001, p. 390).    
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that Greece’s look on the EU issues that favor Turkey can be interpreted as consequences 
of this context. Moreover, the defense industry has broken through. Defense R&D is seen 
as a means of promoting a high technology sector. The grown defense industry increased 
the investment besides technology. The civilian sector also received the benefits of the 
technology spillover.  
D. DISPUTES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE 
Scholars agree that Greece and Turkey enjoyed a period of friendship under 
Turkish President Ataturk and Greek Premier Venizelos (Brauer, 2002) following the 
Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and subsequently the Treaty of Friendship (i.e., the 
Ankara agreement) in 1930. Both countries became allies in the Balkan Pact with 
Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934 following the aftermath of the First World War. It is 
also worth noting that Venizelos nominated Ataturk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934. 
This friendship continued well during the early Cold War as both countries continued as 
allies in 1952 as members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There has 
been continuous tension after 1955 beginning with the Cyprus dispute. In 1959, with the 
agreement of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a constitution was introduced 
giving Cyprus independence with power shared between a Greek Cypriot president and a 
Turkish vice-president. This political structure caused a serious crisis in 1964 and again 
in 1974 (Bozkurt, 1999). In 1963, constitutional amendments proposed by the President 
of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarious, caused violence between the two sides (White, 1993, 
p. 241 as cited in Bozkurt, 1999). “Greek extremists who wanted enosis (union with 
Greece) launched a series of attacks on Turkish Cypriots, killing some and taking others 
hostage” (Cooper & Berdal, 1993, p. 118). “Despite the deployment of UN peacekeepers 
in 1964, sporadic inter-communal violence continued forcing most Turkish Cypriots into 
enclaves throughout the island. In 1974, a Greek Government-sponsored attempt to seize 
control of Cyprus was met by intervention from Turkey” (The World Factbook-Cyprus, 
2007). The relationship deteriorated and reached its lowest point following the Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus to prevent the enosis of Greek Cypriots with Greece under the 
coup regime of Nikos Sampson. 
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From the 1970s and onwards, besides the Cyprus problem there have been 
disputes over the boundary of territorial waters in Aegean, airspace, continental shelf 
rights, and Greek militarization of certain Aegean islands. There has been cycles of 
improvement and worsening of bilateral relations with the long-standing disputes and 
new rapprochements. The Kardak crises (25 December 1995 and 31 January 1996) nearly 
brought the two countries to war. Relations between Greek officials and PKK terrorist 
group leader Abdullah Öcalan, as well as the role of the Greek Embassy in Nairobi 
International Airport in Kenya when Öcalan was captured in an operation by MİT 
(Turkish National Intelligence Organization), caused a crisis in relations between the two 
countries for a period of time (“How Turkey got,” 1999). In August 1999, Turkey 
suffered from a devastating Marmara earthquake that killed thousands of people. In 
September 1999, Greece was also hit by an earthquake. Peoples’ sympathetic response to 
the disastrous earthquakes by sending condolences and rescue teams created an 
“earthquake diplomacy” that changed the bilateral relations by reducing hostility among 
the nations (Gündoğdu, 2001).  
This “earthquake diplomacy” developed into a political dialogue toward détente 
between the states which may be implemented as one of the cycles of improvement. 
During the mutual visits of each Foreign Minister (Mr. G. Papandreou to Ankara 
(January 2000) and then the Turkish counterpart, Mr. Ismail Cem, to Athens (February 
2000)), nine agreements were signed on different areas such as tourism, cultural and 
economic cooperation, combating  against crime and terrorism, and so on to start a 
conflict solution (“Bilateral relations,” 2008). Foreign Ministers of the two countries 
agreed to take up and implement a set of “confidence building measures” in their 
following meeting on December 2000 (“Bilateral relations,” 2008). In 2004, Turkey 
reconfirmed a casus belli if Greece expanded its territorial waters to 12nm. In April 2005, 
Greece and Turkey agreed to establish a direct telephone line between the headquarters of 
the Air Forces of the two countries to inform about military exercises to reduce the 
tension caused by air space violations over the Aegean Sea (“Kırmızı telefon,” 2006). 
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Cycles of improvement and worsening continued as Jerkins (2007) claimed: 
“although the recent improvement in ties has undoubtedly considerably reduced the 
possibility of the two countries going to war, deeply ingrained suspicions and prejudices 
are proving harder to erase”17. General Hilmi Özkök showed an example about suspicion 
and prejudice in his speech at the Turkish War College as follows;  
After the ‘Government Foreign Affairs and Defense Council meeting, 
which is held on the first week of March of each year in Greece to 
determine the defense policy of the country, it is stated that although there 
have been positive developments between the two countries, Turkey’s 
political demands on Greece’s rights of sovereignty have not changed and 
therefore Greece has to maintain the required deterring and reliable force. 
Moreover, during the take-over ceremony of Greece Armed Forces (Chief 
of the General Staff), Turkey was referred to as a threat and the following 
statement was made: ‘Contrary to international justice and the foundations 
of international agreements, threats and unlawful demands made by our 
eastern neighbor constitute her basically unlawful approach’. 
1. Effects of the Disputes on Military Expenditures 
Based on these conflicts and the high defense burden of both countries, there has 
been a considerable amount of research to reveal the existence of a possible arm race 
between the two countries (also see Chapter III). Although no strong evidence has been 
found (Brauer, 2002; Öcal, 2002), it was stated that defense allocations were strongly 
influenced by each other’s military spending (Kollias & Paleologou, 2002; Sezgin & 
Yildirim, 2002). In some certain times, bilateral relations directly affected the defense 
expenditures of each country. 
Turkish and Greek defense spending followed a downward trend up to 1974. The 
defense behavior of both countries largely changed in the post-1974 period with sharp 
                                                 
17 “The Turkish General Staff (TGS) maintains a running log of alleged violations by Greek planes 
and ships on its website. On October 5, 2007, the TGS bitterly denounced Greece for its alleged failure to 
abide by the terms of the bilateral agreements to cooperate against trafficking in illegal migrants. It even 
posted a scorecard of what it claimed was the increasing number of illegal migrants being dumped by the 
Greek authorities in Turkish territorial waters, including 3,047 in the first ten months of 2007 alone 
(www.tsk.mil.tr)” (Jerkins, 2007). 
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increases in their defense shares (Georgiou et al., 1996). Georgiou et al. (1996) stated that 
Turkish and Greek defense shares increased from 3.9 to 5.9 percent and 4.2 to 6.8 percent 
in 1974, respectively.  
The Turkish and Greek defense expenditure during the following period of 1985-
1999 is summarized by Kollias and Paleologou (2002) as follows: 
In comparative terms both countries have allocated a greater share of their 
national income to defense. For example, during 1985–98 Greece on 
average allocated 5.4 percent of GDP to defense while Turkey allocated 
4.2 percent. Both shares are appreciably higher than the EU and NATO 
averages for the same period which were 2.6 percent and 3.1 percent, 
respectively. Furthermore, in the post Cold War period, while most 
countries have reduced their defense budgets, Greece and Turkey have in 
real terms increased their military spending. During 1989–99 total defense 
spending by NATO declined in real terms by about 24 percent. Similarly, 
total E.U. defense expenditure fell by approximately 11 percent. However, 
as SIPRI data show, Greek and Turkish military spending increased in real 
terms by 30 percent and 110 percent, respectively. 
 
                  Data Source: SIPRI




























Figure 5.   Turkish Versus Greek Defense Burden 1988-2005 
Figure 5 plots Greek and Turkish military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(i.e., defense burden ratio) for the period 1988-2005. Some portion of the change in 
defense burden of each country can be explained by the bilateral relation perspective. For 
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example, following mutual visits from each Foreign Minister and a set of agreements 
signed for “confidence building measures” between the year 2000 and 2001, “Athens 
announced a plan to reduce its armed expenditures along with reducing its armed forces 
from 140,000 to 80,000-90,000 men. Turkey also responded to this gesture by postponing 
defense planning measures” (Zilidis, 2004, p. 88).   
On the other hand, a relatively higher defense burden ratio after the year 2003 for 
Greece as seen in Figure 5 draws attention. Greece continues to arm the islands while 
claiming its “justness” over the long-standing disputes.  When all these are assessed it is 
seen that Greece continues to base its National Defense Policy on the assumption that the 
threat comes from the East. 
E. MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
Turkey’s geo-strategic importance, hence its foreign policy, requires strong and 
mobile armed forces which are also required for increased firepower. Being equipped 
with modern and advanced weapons is needed not only for security concerns but also for 
being a reliable ally in international peacekeeping efforts. In Turkey’s perspective, 
ensuring the effective deterrence during peace times and rapid intervention in times of 
crises may have been maintained by continued efforts of upgrading and modernizing of 
military power.  
Turkey officially announced a military modernization program in 1996 that 
mainly consisted of procuring high technology equipment and upgrading older systems, 
which was expected to total $150 billion within 30 years (Valasek, 1999). A further 
revision of a 10-year $20 billion bill was included in early 2000 to overcome the 
bottleneck in the modernization plan (Günlük-Şenesen & Sezgin, 2003). This plan made 
Turkey one of the most active buyers of weapons in the world after the post-Cold War 
era.  
Hen-Tov (2004) states that military modernization is expected to bring forth 
several consequences. The emergence of Turkey as a major buyer has profound effects on 
the political economy of western weapons supplier states. The military modernization 
program helps to build a substantial Turkish military industry to further augment its 
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deterrence. Almost all procurement plans include investment offsets, explicit co-
production with Turkish firms, or alternative means of technology transfer. Moreover, 
training with the most up-to-date equipment and earning international respect from other 
NATO countries will ensure strengthen the military's domestic image of professionalism. 
Moreover, potential military contracts are used for political purposes such as gaining 
support from Germany and other EU states for Turkey's EU candidacy.18  
The objective of raising the Turkish defense industry during the modernization 
stage seems to have been managed. Along with the state, the private sector is playing a 
major role in making Turkey’s defense industry more competitive and developed. There 
has been rapid expansion among a growing number of defense manufacturing 
subcontractors. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security Report (2003) on Turkey 
indicated that 21 percent of the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces were met by domestic 
production for the main weapons, equipment and spare parts, while the remaining 79 
percent was supplied from abroad. Strategic Plan 2007-2011 (2007) of the Under-
Secretariat of Defense Industries (SSM) of Turkey, namely the procurement authority 
leading the Turkish defense industry, indicates that their goal is to increase the average 
portion to meet the system requirements though local infrastructure currently at 25 
percent to 50 percent through the year 2010. Strategic Plan 2007-2011 states that 
concurrently, Turkey would increase exports of defense products and services to around 
$1 billion per year by 2011, up from the current $200-300 million per year. The SSM 
target for defense exports is $1.8 billion between 2006 and 2016. SSM has already 
earmarked around $1 billion for research and development (R&D) programs. 
It is clear that the military modernization program requires money transfers which 
would lower the well being of society due to possible negative welfare tradeoff. 
However, if Turkey manages to reach its aim of focusing on the projects to be locally 
                                                 
18 Other examples are as follows (Valasek, 1999); “in June 1998, Turkey suspended arms talks with 
France in protest to the passage in the French National Assembly of a bill recognizing the 1915 events as if 
Armenian genocide. Similarly, in 1998, the Italian company Agusta SpA was briefly scratched from the list 
of contenders for Turkey's order of 145 attack helicopters after the Rome government gave shelter to 
Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. One of the bilateral relationships most obviously affected by the 
modernization program is Turkey's strategic partnership with Israel, whose cornerstone has been industrial 
defense cooperation.” 
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produced and those could be sold in the world markets, the modernization program may 
have a positive effect on economic growth in the sense of spinoff and spillover as well as 
an external balance term while increasing deterrence and creating a safe environment. 
F. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Turkey's economy is composed of modern industry and commerce along with a 
traditional agricultural sector that still accounts for more than 35 percent of employment 
in the country. Both a capable workforce and diverse natural resources are the advantages 
in addition to its proximity to global markets due to its strategic geographic position 
among Asia, Europe and the Middle East (Turkey Country Overview-WorldWatch, 2008, 
p. 87). Turkey’s easy access to strategically important regions and major energy sources 
enables it to reach a diverse market and facilitate potential for economic growth. 
Turkey experienced rapid economic growth following the economic liberalization 
which began in the early 1980s because of a large increase in tax revenues. Rapid 
increase in economic growth led the military to carry out the modernization plan. While 
military expenditures jumped an average 12 percent from 1989-99 in absolute terms, 
military expenditures as a percentage of overall government expenditures fell from 18.4 
percent to 13.9 percent (U.S. Department of State, WMEAT, 2000 as cited in Hen-Tov, 
2004). This “fiscal windfall” prepared an environment for the Turkish military to urge for 
a full-scale military modernization (Hen-Tov, 2004). 
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Data Source: TURKSTAT, SPO
GNP data for the year 2006 is taken from Ministry of Finance database








































































Figure 6.   GNP Percentage Change at 1987 Prices 1980-2006 
However, economic growth following the liberalization program did not continue 
for a long time. Turkey experienced high interest and inflation rates, volatile growth 
rates, high unemployment rates, and high fiscal deficits during its economical 
liberalization and privatization history. Coalition governments were incapable of making 
hard economic decisions and sticking to them during the 1990s. The economic situation 
was affected by the recession in Europe, the custom union with the EU, and unstable 
growth rates. A decade of economic mismanagement during the 1990s resulted in a rising 
current account deficit by late 2000. Even after Turkey undertook several disinflation and 
stabilization programs arrangements with the IMF, Turkey's economy could not escape 
from suffering a series of banking and economic crises in 2001. The disinflation and 
stabilization program which was prepared and carried out under IMF supervision started 
in Turkey on January 1, 2000, collapsed in February 2001. The program was launched to 
reduce the high inflation rates that Turkey had been in trouble with for a long time. The 
consequences of the collapse were damaging for the Turkish economy. It was the biggest 




During the years of economic crises there had been huge accelerations on entries 
in and exits from the Turkish market by foreign investors because of the fragility of the 
financial system and potential risk.  There were extraordinary interest rates. For instance, 
on November 30, 2000, the Central Bank reversed its policy and announced that “it 
would no longer fund the commercial banks in the interbank market and this 
announcement skyrocketed (over 1000%) the overnight interest rates to four-digit levels” 
(Ardic et al., 2007). Political crises turned into economic crises at some certain times. For 
example, on February 19, 2001, a political crisis between the Prime Minister and the 
President seriously hit the markets. “Over-night interest rate rose abruptly up to 2000% 
on the 20th of February, and to 4000% on the next day. Rising interest rates, with 
overnight rates reaching 5000%, could not stop the rapid flight from the TL. Within two 
days shares on the Istanbul stock exchange had fallen by 63%. Foreign investors pulled 
$5 billion out of Turkey on 19 February alone” (Satıroğlu, 2001).  
Failure in privatization and banking reforms led to the collapse of confidence in 
Turkey. Political uncertainty caused loss of confidence in both internal and external 
environments. Failure of the government to fully implement the program was the main 
reason for the crises from the IMF perspective. Nevertheless, the main reason of the 
crises was different from the Turkish perspective. Some scholars blamed the program 
itself as the main reason of the crisis, as Turkey’s infrastructure was not ready for 
transformation and it did not experience fiscal discipline in the past. Thus, the weak 
economic situation combined with an incorrect economic program led to crises (Erçel, 
1999). 
Turkey (and also Greece) is a leading recipient of U.S. arms. The U.S. used to 
provide the Turkish government with grants and loans to finance the purchase of new 
American weapons but was stopped by the U.S. Congress in 1998 because of an 
assessment that Turkey then possessed sufficient funds to finance its arms purchases. It is 
also important to note that, despite demands for tight fiscal and monetary control and 
economic vigilance of the IMF to reduce the high inflation, the Turkish Government 
continued to keep high levels of defense spending during the twin crises in 1999 and 
2001 as was seen in Figure 2. 
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Although Turkey's economy suffered from a series of banking and economic 
crises in 2001 as well as a deep economic downturn and increase in unemployment under 
the coalition governments with weak economic policies, Turkey's economy has recovered 
strongly since then. Following the crises, the government agreed to tighten economic 
policy, which improved macroeconomic performance, and accelerated the performance 
of the banking system. Its economy grew an average of 7.5% per year from 2002 through 
2006, which was one of the highest sustained rates of growth in the world. A CIA report 
summarized the post-crises Turkish economic overview as follows; 
The economy is turning around with the implementation of economic 
reforms, and 2004 GDP growth reached 9%, followed by roughly 5% 
annual growth from 2005-06. Inflation fell to 7.7% in 2005 - a 30-year 
low but climbed back to 9.8% in 2006. Despite the strong economic gains 
from 2002-06, which were largely due to renewed investor interest in 
emerging markets, IMF backing, and tighter fiscal policy, the economy is 
still burdened by a high current account deficit and high debt. Prior to 
2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey averaged less than $1 
billion annually, but further economic and judicial reforms and 
prospective EU membership are expected to boost FDI. Privatization sales 
are currently approaching $21 billion (The World Factbook-Turkey, 
2007). 
Worldwatch’s economic overview of Turkey (2008, pp. 87-88) reports that 
“Turkey's current account has been in deficit in recent years owing to its large deficit in 
the merchandise trade balance, although it runs surpluses in the services and the transfers 
balances.” The report continues by stating that “the current account deficit has continued 
to widen, to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2006 from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2005, due to strong 
growth in imports driven by consumer demand. Nevertheless, increased FDI led to a 
buildup of gross international reserves, which increased to US$54.5 billion in 2006 from 
US$52.2 billion in 2005.” 
According to Kemal Unakıtan, the Minister of Finance of Turkey, the growth rate 
would probably become 5.5 percent of GDP and reaching 716.6 billion liras in 2008, up 
from 575.8 billion liras in 2007. According to the balance of payments report of the 
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Central Bank, the current account deficit is expected to be 36.4 billion USD at the end of 
year 2008, while it was 29.6 billion USD in January-October 2007 and 26.7 billion USD 
in 2006 (“Government unveils 2008,” 2007). 
G. OTHER FACTORS 
In addition to the factors analyzed above, there are several more factors for 
Turkey that have been causing high-level military expenditures or have the potential to 
increase military expenditures in the future. Some of those factors are summarized in the 
following paragraphs.  
Internal political factors may also be one of the determinants of the defense 
expenditures. Since the requirement of strong military power has obtained common 
acceptance in contrast to most Western countries, the Turkish military modernization 
program that announced in 1996 has never become the subject of parliamentary debates. 
In other words, the Turkish military arranged its defense budget and procurement policies 
within fiscal limits without encountering opposition in parliament (Karaosmanoğlu, 
2000). 
Another factor may be peace support operations. As a result of the changing new 
security requirements after the Cold War and 9/11, peace support operations have 
increased significantly. In parallel with Atatürk's proverb, “peace at home; peace in the 
world,” Turkey participates in ‘peace support’ and ‘war on terror’ operations to the 
greatest extent possible in parallel with its international commitments, national interests, 
and capabilities (see Appendix C). The Responsibility Sharing Report (2002) stated that 
Turkey contributed far more than its “fair share” of NATO’s military force in all of the 
following categories: active-duty military personnel, ground combat capability, naval 
tonnage, and combat aircraft capability.  
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The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)19 crude oil pipeline which started to pump oil for 
the first time on May 10, 2005, from Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea created 
greater geopolitical importance for Turkey since the pipeline is an important leg of the 
East-West energy corridor. It will require constant guarding to prevent sabotage, although 
since the entire pipeline is buried it will be difficult to attack. However, energy pipelines 
which cut across Turkey are too long for complete protection from possible sabotage. The 
PKK terrorist group has issued big threat towards this pipeline such that security 
concerns of the pipeline will probably increase the cost of guarding in the future. 
Turkey’s immediate environment continues to generate big threats. In addition to 
Iran’s aggressive foreign policies, its possible acquisition of nuclear weapons introduces 
new security challenges for Turkey in the Middle East. “A nuclear-weapons-capable Iran 
with its important strategic position would pose a great danger to peace and stability in 
the Middle East. An Iran with the capability of mass destruction would fundamentally 
alter the balance of power and this situation is not acceptable for Turkey’s security” 
(Arslan, 2007). 
There had been years of cold relations due to mutual threat perception with Syria. 
Although there has been betterment in bilateral relations since signing the Adana Accord 
in 1998 with neighbor Syria, the two countries came close to war during the capture of 
terrorist leader Öcalan. Additionally, distribution of the waters of the Euphrates, Tigris 
and Asi rivers created a water dispute with Syria which has been the major issue between 
the two countries. 
There are many more factors related to historic and future levels of Turkish 
defense spending, such as EU membership, the Kurdish and Islamist question, civil-
military relations, aftermath of the Iraq operation, relations with post-Soviet Turkic 
countries, Arab states and Israel, the Caucasus countries, and the Balkan countries. These 
factors were not investigated due to their relatively lower effects on military 
expenditures.  
                                                 
19 The pipeline is named after the following. Baku is the capital of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi is the capital of 
Georgia; and Ceyhan is a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This goal of this project was to illuminate the relationship between defense 
expenditure and economic growth for Turkey by employing a causal multiple regression 
method that would lead to recommendations for future Turkish policy. Various aspects of 
the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth were investigated to 
support the results and implications of the empirical study. The following conclusions 
highlight the path taken during this research. 
Defense economics emerged as a relatively new field of study within the sub-
disciplines of economics. The peace dividend, security, and opportunity cost concerns 
have made defense economic more favorable in parallel to level of conflict among 
countries. The most recent trend in world military expenditure is a good reason to claim 
that its importance will continue for the foreseeable future. 
There are comprehensive reviews of literature on the defense-growth relationship. 
Many empirical studies have been published to understand the relationship between 
defense spending and economic growth for various countries for a range of periods by 
using an assortment of methods. However, there is still controversy about whether 
defense expenditures cause a higher or lower growth rate.  
There is no clear-cut result for a defense-growth relationship. The vast literature 
on the economic effects of military expenditure suggests a number of different linkages 
between defense spending and output. They can be broadly grouped into supply-side 
effects, demand-side effects, and security effects. The supply-side approach focuses on 
the opportunity cost of scarce resources and claims that defense spending diverts scarce 
resources away from more productive uses. This causes a reduction in civilian 
consumption and lowers the well-being of the society because of the reduction in civilian 
and public savings and investments. Although supply-side approach suggests an overall 
adverse affect of defense spending on economic growth, positive spillover effects of 
defense spending have nonetheless received attention in the literature. On the other hand, 
Keynesian Theory assumes that idle resources are available in the economy, and 
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concludes that the net effect of defense expenditures on growth is positive. Another 
positive side of the military expenditure is a safe environment for members of the society 
which is crucial for the efficient operation of markets. 
Different definitions, price deflators and choice of exchange rate make the 
international comparison difficult and the available data less reliable. Moreover, only 
limited data is available for some countries because of the secrecy applications which 
contribute to a reliability problem on available data. Reliability problems should be taken 
under consideration before making any prediction or implication by the researchers, since 
using misleading measures create bias and errors. 
Taking account of the difficulties present in previous military expenditure studies, 
an econometric model was specified and empirically tested using Turkish data for 1969-
2004. The results of the growth model supported hypothesized linkages between 
economic growth and the hypothesized explanatory variables. The positive linkage 
between investment and economic growth supported the hypothesis that investment is an 
important determinant of growth. Also, the model showed that the external balance on 
goods and services has a negative effect on economic growth in Turkey. The findings of 
study revealed that the effect of military expenditures on growth is negative. Results 
suggested that there is a negative linkage between military expenditure and economic 
growth. 
The second part of the empirical study tested the defense-welfare relationship for 
Turkey, using expenditures on health and education as welfare proxies. The empirical 
findings suggested that there are tradeoffs between military expenditures and welfare 
spending. However, the tradeoff between military expenditures and either health or 
education is different. While there is a negative tradeoff between military expenditures 
and health, the tradeoff is positive for education. These results supported the idea that 
increased defense expenditures reduce the resources available for health, but do not 
crowd out education. Health education implies that defense has a priority in the budgeting 
process over health expenditures. All of the results should be interpreted carefully with 
data consistency and other problems considered. 
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The growth model results suggested that reducing military expenditures can be 
expected in order to increase growth. If more capital resources are used in the civilian 
economy following defense cutbacks, then this result is plausible. However, both external 
and internal security concerns make it difficult to decrease defense spending. 
Strategic factors such as the conflict with terrorism, disputes with Greece, the 
economic environment, and military modernization programs are major factors for the 
level of Turkish military expenditures. Even though there have been fluctuations ranging 
from better to worse on these issues, predicting a continuing trend in the high level of 
military expenditures for the future is very plausible. This is because military expenditure 
is crucial to providing a strong defense which provides deterrence and security in a 
changing threat and risk environment. The high current account deficit and debt may be 
problematic for the future economic situation. However, high levels of military 
expenditures regardless of economic performance were an integral part of Turkey’s 
national security strategy. Indeed, Turkey continues its military modernization plan 
purposefully. Recent events in the conflict with PKK terrorism show that the prevention 
of terrorism will likely increase the defense burden in the Turkish economy. Suspicion 
and prejudice are still valid on bilateral Greek-Turkish relations. Complex relations with 
neighboring countries increase the unpredictability of regional threats and risks. 
The downward trend from 2001 to 2005 in real military expenditure has been 
reversed. Recent years’ budgets and evolution of the regional security environment show 
that predicting an increase in military expenditure is feasible. This increase is not a waste 
of money but a key step in managing Turkey’s national defense. If Turkey manages to 
meet the system requirements through local infrastructure in its military modernization 
program, Turkey may manage to decrease the negative effects of military expenditures on 
economic growth via a spinoff effect of military expenditures. In that case, spillovers of 




The Turkish Republic’s defense policy, since its foundation, has been guided by 
Ataturk’s proverb of “peace at home, peace in the world.” However, sustaining a peaceful 
environment has required a high level of military expenditures. Accordingly, the efficient 
and effective allocation and use of scarce defense resources and budget should be the 






















APPENDIX A. AREAS OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS 
Areas of Defense Economics (Hartley, 1993, p. 78) 
A. Macroeconomics: Developed and Developing Countries 
1. Determinants of defense spending 
2. Burdens and benefits of expenditures (including trade-offs) 
3. Growth and development 
4. Country studies 
B. International Trade: Arms Trade 
C. Alliances: International Public Goods 
D. Microeconomics: Demand and Supply 
1. Features of defense markets (public goods) 
2. Procurement 
3. Contract types 
4. Defense industries 
5. Research and development 
6. Procurement options (e.g., importing; collaboration) 
7. Regional impacts 
8. Case-studies (industry and project case-studies) 
9. Labor markets 
(a) Employment in defense industries 
(b) Military manpower: recruitment, training, retention 
E. Disarmament, conversion and Peace 
1. Causes of war 
2. Arms race model 
3. Arms limitation 
4. Disarmament 
5. Conversion 













































APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
Definitions of Military Expenditures (Herrera, 1994, pp. 15-17) 
A. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
“All current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, in the running of 
defense departments and other government agencies engaged in defense projects as well 
as space projects; the cost of paramilitary forces and police when judged to be trained and 
equipped for military operations; military R&D, tests and evaluation costs; and costs of 
retirement pensions of service personnel including pensions of civilian employees. 
Military aid is included in the expenditure of the donor countries. Excluded are items of 
civil defense, interest on war debts and veterans’ payments” (Şen, 1992, p.3 as cited in 
Herrera, 1994, p. 15).  
B. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
“All expenditure, whether by defense or other departments, for the maintenance 
of military forces, including the purchase of military supplies and equipment (including 
the stockpiling of finished items but not the industrial raw materials required for their 
production), military construction, recruiting, training, equipping, moving, feeding, 
clothing and housing members of the armed forces, and providing remuneration, medical 
care, and other services for them. Also included are capital expenditures for the provision 
of quarters to families of military personnel, outlays on military schools, and research and 
development serving clearly and foremost the purposes of defense. Military forces also 
include paramilitary organizations such as gendarmerie, constabulary, security forces, 
border and customs guards, and other trained, equipped and available for use as military 
personnel. Also falling under this category are expenditures for purposes of strengthening 
the public services to meet wartime emergencies, training civil defense personnel, and 
acquiring materials and equipment for these purposes. Included also are expenditures for 
foreign military aid and contributions to foreign to international military organizations 
and alliances. This category excludes expenditures for non-military purposes, though 
incurred by a ministry or department of defense, and any payments or services provided 
to war veterans and retired army personnel” (Şen & Deger, 1986, Chapter 2, pp .37-59 as 
cited in Herrera, 1994, p. 15). 
United Nations (UN) 
The United Nations has framed the definition with three categories of military 
expenditures: (A) operating costs; (B) procurement and construction; and (C) research 
and development (Herrera, 1994, p. 17). 
A. Operating costs 
(1) Personnel 
 a) conscripts; b) other military; c) civilian 
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(2) Operations and maintenance 
 a) current-use material; b) maintenance and repairs; c) purchased services; d) 
rent. 
B. Procurement and construction 
(1) Procurement 
 a) aircraft and engines; b) missiles, including conventional warheads; c) nuclear 
warheads and bombs; d) ships and boats; e) armored vehicles; f) artillery; g) other 
ordnance and ground force arms; h) ammunition; i) electronics and communications; j) 
non-armored vehicles. 
(2) Construction 
a) airbases; b) missile sites; c) naval bases; d) electronics and communications; e) 
personnel; f) medical; g) training; h) warehouses and depots; i) command, administration; 
j) fortifications; k) shelters. 
C. Research and development 
(1) Basic and applied 




APPENDIX C. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO WAR ON 
TERRORISM AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Turkey’s Contribution to War on Terrorism and Peace Support Operations 
(USCENTCOM) 
 Contribution to War on Terrorism 
• Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation (since 
2001) 
• Contribution to NATO Training Mission in Iraq 
• Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) And Black Sea Harmony (since 2001) 
• Turkey's Fight Against Drug-Trafficking in The Context of the Contributions 
to Counter-Terrorism 
• Contribution of Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to Peace Support Operations 
o Past Operations 
• United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (Between 02 January 1993 
and 22 February 1994) 
• United Nations Peace Protection Force (UNPROFOR) - Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Between 04 August 1993 and 20 December 1995) 
• NATO Implementation/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) -Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Between 20 December 1996 and 02 December 2004) 
• Operation Sharp Guard (Between 13 July 1992 and 2 October 1996) 
• Operations Deny Flight/Deliberate Forge/Joint Guardian 
• Operation ALBA in Albania (during the period of 16 April to 01 August 
1997) 
• Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony, Concordia and Proxima 
Operations in Macedonia (between 27 August and 15 December 2005) 
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo (21 July and 01 December 2006) 
• NATO Humanitarian Assistance Operation in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina (30 September and 08 October 2005) 
• Humanitarian Assistance Operation in the Aftermath of Pakistan Earthquake 
in 2005 
o Operations Currently Participated By Turkey 
• Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 02 December 2004) 
• Kosovo (since 24 March 1999) 
• Darfur/Sudan 
• Lebanon (since October 2006) 
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• In addition to Peace Support Operations, Turkey is currently involved in 3 
military International Observer Missions in Hebron, Georgia and Sudan, and 
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